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1.  Je~ey  A. Frankel 
The Making of Exchange Rate Policy in the 1980s 
Although the 1970s were the decade when foreign exchange rates broke free 
of the confines of the Bretton Woods system, under which governments since 
1944 had been committed to keeping them fixed, the 1980s were the decade 
when large movements in exchange rates first became a serious issue in the 
political arena. For the first time, currencies claimed their share of  space on 
the editorial and front pages of American newspapers. For the first time, con- 
gressmen expostulated on such arcane issues as the difference between steri- 
lized and unsterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market and pro- 
posed bills to take some of  the responsibility for exchange rate policy away 
from the historical Treasury-Fed duopoly. 
The history of the dollar during the decade breaks up fairly neatly into three 
phases: 198  1-84,  when the currency appreciated sharply against trading part- 
ners’ currencies; 1985-86, when the dollar peaked and reversed the entire dis- 
tance of  its ascent; and  1987-90,  when the exchange rate fluctuated within 
a range that-compared  to the preceding roller coaster-seemed  relatively 
stable (see fig. 5.1). It was of course the unprecedented magnitude of the up- 
swing from 1980 to February 1985, 59 percent in the Fed’s trade-weighted 
index, that made the exchange rate such a potent issue. US. exporters lost 
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price competitiveness on world markets, and other U.S.  firms faced intense 
competition from cheaper imports. Most analysts considered the appreciation 
of the dollar (allowing for the usual lag of at least two years in trade effects) 
to be the primary cause of the subsequent deterioration of the U.S. merchan- 
dise trade deficit, which rose $123 billion from 1982 to 1987. 
This paper begins with a review of the history of exchange rate policy during 
the 1980s. It then proceeds to discuss the competing philosophical views, pro- 
posals, and economic theories and the competing objectives, interest groups, 
and policymakers that went into the determination of policy. The paper con- 
cludes with some thoughts on possible generalizations regarding the political 
economy of exchange rates. 
It must be acknowledged from the outset that the topic of exchange rate 
policy differs in at least one fundamental respect from such topics as regula- 
tory or trade policy: many economists believe that there is no such thing as 
exchange rate policy or, to be more precise, that there is no independent scope 
for the government to affect the exchange rate after taking into account mone- 
tary policy (and perhaps fiscal policy or some of the microeconomic policies 
that are considered by other papers in this volume). 
There are, on the other hand, many who believe that such tools as foreign 
exchange intervention  and capital controls can have independent effects on the 
exchange rate. Everyone agrees, furthermore,  that an announcement  by govern- 
ment officials regarding a desired path for the exchange rate or regarding pos- 
sible changes in exchange rate regimes (e.g., fixed vs. pure floating, vs. man- 295  Exchange Rate Policy 
aged floating, or vs.  target  zones) can have  important effects via  market 
participants’ perceptions of its implications for future monetary policy. 
If this were a paper on the economics of exchange rate determination, then 
it would be central to try to settle the issue of whether the money-supply pro- 
cess and a stable money-demand relationship can together explain the ex- 
change rate. But the assignment here concerns the political process of policy 
determination rather than the economic process of exchange rate determina- 
tion. There is no question that the exchange rate is a distinct subject for con- 
cern, debate, deliberation, and attempted influence. 
In exchange rate policy, as in regulatory policy, “do nothing” is one of the 
options for the government. Indeed, as we shall see, this was the option offi- 
cially adopted during the first Reagan administration, 198  1-84.  Nevertheless, 
it is by no means a foregone conclusion that this option is the one that is most 
desirable from an economic standpoint or that it is the one that is likely to 
prevail for long from a political standpoint. 
5.1  The Chronology of U.S. Exchange Rate Policy in the 1980s 
5.1.1  The First Phase of Dollar Appreciation, 1980-82 
The dollar ended the 1970s in the same fashion that it had started it, by 
falling in value. The devaluations of  1971 and 1973 had been deliberate at- 
tempts to eliminate the accumulating disequilibrium of  the Bretton Woods 
years. The depreciation of  1977-78  also began with a deliberate attempt by 
Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal  and others in the Carter administration 
to “talk down” the dollar. In the absence of a willingness among trading part- 
ners to expand at as rapid a rate as the United States, a depreciation of the 
dollar was at the time viewed as the natural way of staving off the then-record 
US. trade deficits that were beginning to emerge. But the decline soon got out 
of control. The depreciation of the late 1970s is now usually thought of, in the 
economic arena, as a symptom of excessive U.S. monetary expansion and, in 
the political arena, as one of many symbols of the “malaise” that is popularly 
associated with the Carter administration. 
The reversal of this down phase in the dollar began, not with the coming of 
Ronald Reagan, but rather with the monetary tightening by Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul Volcker. In October 1979, the Fed announced a change in its 
open market procedures, designed to combat inflation and motivated partly by 
the need to restore the dollar to international  respectability. For the subsequent 
several years, Volcker showed his determination to let interest rates rise how- 
ever far they had to rise to defeat the inflation of the 1970s. During the period 
1981-82,  the U.S.  long-term government bond rate averaged 13.3 percent, a 
two-point increase relative to 1980. Interest rates among a weighted average 
of trading partners rose as well, but not by as much: the U.S. differential aver- 
aged 1.9 percent over 1981-82,  compared to 0.6 percent in 1979-80.  The real 296  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
(i.e., inflation-adjusted)  interest rate differential rose even more, by between 
two and three points, depending on the measure of  expected inflation used 
(Frankel 1985). The increase in the relative attractiveness of dollar assets in 
the eyes of global investors brought about between 1980 and 1982 an apprecia- 
tion of the U.S.  dollar by 29 percent in nominal terms and 28 percent in real 
terms. Evidence of the textbook-perfect effects of  the monetary contraction 
was seen, not only in the rise of the dollar, but also more broadly in the reces- 
sions of 1980 and 1981-82.  The traditional channel of monetary transmission 
to the real economy, the negative effect of an increase in interest rates on the 
construction industry and  other interest rate-sensitive  sectors, was  subse- 
quently joined by the modem channel of transmission, the negative effect of 
an increase in the value of the dollar on export industries and other exchange 
rate-sensitive  sectors. 
5.1.2  The Second Phase of Dollar Appreciation, 1983-84 
The trough of the recession came at the end of  1982; a recovery began in 
1983 that was both vigorous and destined to be long lived. The dollar contin- 
ued on its previous upward path. Between 1982 and 1984, it appreciated an- 
other 17 percent in nominal terms and 14 percent in real terms. The textbooks 
had no trouble explaining why global investors continued to find dollar assets 
increasingly attractive: the U.S. long-term real interest rate continued to rise 
until its peak in mid-1984. The differential vis-his trading partners during 
1983-84  averaged about 1 percentage point higher than in the previous two 
years. Nor did the textbooks have much trouble explaining the source of this 
increase in U.S. real interest rates. As the Reagan administration cut income 
tax rates, indexed tax brackets for inflation, and began a massive buildup of 
military spending, the budget deficit rose from 2 percent of GNP in the 1970s 
to 5 percent of GNP in the mid-1980s. (The sharp increase in the budget deficit 
in 1982 could be blamed largely on the recession. But, by  1985, the increase 
was mostly structural.) The increased demand for funds that these deficits rep- 
resented readily explains the increase in U.S. interest rates, the inflow of capi- 
tal from abroad, and the associated appreciation of the dollar. 
At the same time, the effects of the ever-loftier dollar began to be felt in 
earnest among those U.S. industries that rely on exports for customers or that 
compete with imports. The affected sectors on the export side included particu- 
larly agriculture, capital goods, and aircraft and other transportation equip- 
ment; on the import side they included textiles, steel, motorcycles, and con- 
sumer  electronics; and  on  both  sides they  included  semiconductors and 
automobiles. Overall, the effects on exports and imports added up to a $67 
billion trade deficit in 1983, double the record levels of 1977-78.  This too was 
a prediction of the standard textbook model. The fiscal expansion was essen- 
tially “crowding out” private spending on American goods, not only in the 
interest rate-sensitive  sectors through the traditional route, but also in the 
exchange rate-sensitive  sectors through the modern route. 297  Exchange Rate Policy 
5.1.3  The Noninterventionist  Policy of the First Reagan Administration 
Throughout this period, 1981-84,  the Reagan administration  had an explic- 
itly laissez-faire (or benign neglect) policy toward the foreign exchange mar- 
ket. The policy was noninterventionist in the general sense that the movement 
of the dollar was not seen as requiring any sort of  government response or, 
indeed, as a problem. It was also noninterventionist in the narrower sense that 
the authorities refrained from intervening in the foreign exchange market, that 
is, from the selling (or buying) of dollars in exchange for marks, yen, or other 
foreign currencies. The undersecretary for monetary affairs, Beryl Sprinkel, 
announced in the third month of the administration that its intention was not 
to undertake such intervention except in the case of “disorderly markets.” Lest 
anyone think that the quallfying phrase was sufficiently elastic to include com- 
mon fluctuations in the exchange rate, he explained that the sort of example of 
disorderly markets that the administration  had in mind was the occasion of the 
March 1981 shooting and wounding of the president.’ The historical data re- 
veal that this date was in fact almost the only occasion between 1981 and 1984 
when the US.  authorities intervened in the market. 
I shall discuss in sections 5.2 and 5.3 the various philosophies that gave rise 
to the laissez-faire stance of the first Reagan administration. For the moment, 
let us note that the matter is somewhat more complicated than a simple case 
of government regulation versus the free market. 
For Sprinkel, a longtime member of the monetarist “Shadow Open Market 
Committee” and follower of Milton Friedman, the matter was  a simple case of 
the virtues of the free market. Under floating exchange rates, the price of for- 
eign currency is whatever it has to be to equilibrate the demand and supply of 
foreign currency in the market; it is, virtually by definition, the “correct price.” 
Attempts by the monetary authorities to intervene in the foreign exchange mar- 
ket to keep the value of  the currency artificially high or artificially low are 
unsound gambles with the taxpayers’ money, as likely to be counterproductive 
as attempts by the Department of  Agriculture to intervene in the market for 
grain to keep the price of grain artificially high or artificially low. 
But there were other free market conservatives in the starting team at Trea- 
sury, the supply-siders,  who believed in the need to stabilize the exchange rate 
just as firmly as the monetarists believed in the desirability of leaving it to be 
determined by the market. The issue was settled firmly on the side of noninter- 
vention by  the secretary, Donald Regan. He had neither a monetarist nor a 
supply-sider philosophy (nor, indeed, much of  an economic or philosophic 
framework of any sort). Regan, rather, saw the issue more in terms of politics 
and personalities. In the absence of any guidance from the White House (and, 
on exchange rate policy even more than on other areas of policy, there was in 
1. The source here, as for many other points in this paper, is the authoritative study by Destler 
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fact no guidance forthcoming from the White House [see Regan 1988]), Regan 
saw his role as defending himself and the president from any suggestions that 
the status quo with respect to the dollar was a bad thing or that it required a 
response. He subscribed to the “safe-haven” view that the pattern of capital 
inflow, dollar appreciation, and trade deficit was the result of the favorable 
investment climate created by the Reagan tax cuts and regulatory changes, in 
opposition to the textbook view that it was the result of a fiscal expansion and 
an increase in real interest rates. 
When the heads of state of the G-7 countries met at Williamsburg, Virginia, 
28-30  May 1983, the Europeans complained to Reagan about America’s bud- 
get deficit and its effects such as high interest rates. But Reagan and Regan 
responded that the strong dollar and U.S. trade deficits were not problems and, 
in any case, were not due to high interest rates and fiscal expansion (Putnam 
and Bayne 1987,179). 
Within the first Reagan administration, the view that the strong dollar was 
the result of the differential in real interest rates was put forward early and 
often by Martin Feldstein, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers 
from 1982 to 1984.2  His view was that the source of the increase in real interest 
rates was the increase in the federal structural budget deficit and the conse- 
quent shortfall of national saving. This explanation was increasingly accepted 
as the correct one for the appreciating dollar and widening trade deficit by 
other members of the president’s cabinet. Representatives of trading partners’ 
governments also tended to share this view. But it was rejected by the Treasury 
and some White House aides, principally on the grounds that the emphasis on 
the “twin deficits” amounted to “selling short” America and the president’s 
policies. Regan and Feldstein were frequently described in the press as em- 
battled over the issue. 
In February 1984, the annual Economic Report of  the President, the main 
text of which is in fact always the report of the Council of Economic Advisers, 
was submitted to the Congress. It contained an estimate that the market consid- 
ered the dollar to be “overvalued” by more than 30 percent and a forecast that, 
as a consequence, the trade deficit would almost double to approximately  $110 
billion in 1984 and that the borrowing to finance these deficits would in 1985 
convert the United States from a net creditor to a net debtor in the international 
accounts. In Senate testimony, when asked to reconcile this pessimistic outlook 
with his own, more rosy, forecasts, Regan was quoted as saying that, as far 
as he was concerned, the senators could throw the report of the Council of 
Economic Advisers into the waste ba~ket.~ 
2. After the Williamsburg Summit, Feldstein told the press that he hoped that the meeting had 
increased awareness of the dangers of the dollar appreciation (Putnam and Bayne 1987, 179). 
3. As part of the interagency review process in January, Don Regan had (unsuccessfully) threat- 
ened Feldstein that  he would tell the president not to sign the Report if it did not adopt a more 
upbeat tone than the existing draft, abandoning its emphasis on the bad outlook for the trade deficit 
and its analysis of the dollar as the major cause of the problem. The text was not altered in sub- 
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5.1.4  The Yen/Dollar Agreement of 1984 
Complaints about the strong dollar and the effect it was having on trade 
were heard increasingly, however, and administration policymakers became 
increasingly aware of two (related) risks: that trade would be a potent weapon 
that the Democrats would use in the November 1984 presidential election and 
that such complaints would result in protectionist legislation on Capitol Hill. 
In October 1983, therefore, Regan launched the yen/dollar campaign, an at- 
tempt to respond to the political issue of the appreciating dollar and widening 
trade deficit, without abandoning the administration’s free market orientation. 
(As was also true later, the Treasury continued to resist the characterization 
that the dollar was “too high” and preferred to say that other currencies-in 
this case the yen-were  “too low.”) In subcabinet and cabinet meetings, Regan 
succeeded in setting the request for liberalization  as a top U.S. priority in Presi- 
dent Reagan’s visit to Japan and his meeting with prime Minister Nakasone in 
November 1983. As a result, a working group of  Treasury and Ministry of 
Finance representatives  was formed, and its work culminated in the Yen/Dollar 
Agreement of May  1984. 
I described in my 1984 study how the impetus behind the U.S. campaign for 
Japanese liberalization  was rooted in what I considered  questionable  economic 
logic on the part of Treasury Secretary Don Regan.4 This was the notion that 
Japanese financial liberalization would help promote capital flow from the 
United States to Japan, rather than the reverse, and would help reduce the cor- 
responding U.S.  trade deficit, through an appreciation of the yen against the 
dollar. Regan acquired this theory from an American businessman, Caterpillar 
Tractor Chairman Lee Morgan, in late September 1983.5  It was not a theory 
that had previously had many adherents in the U.S. government.6 
The questionable component of the argument adopted by  Regan was the 
proposition that the Japanese authorities at the time were using capital controls 
or administrative guidance to discourage the flow of  capital into Japan and to 
depress the value of the yen. Prohibitions against foreign acquisition of most 
Japanese assets did in fact exist in the 1970s,  but they were formally eliminated 
in the Foreign Exchange Law of December 1980. The de fact0 liberalization 
dated from April 1979. It is evident from a comparison of  the Euroyen and 
4. My  study was published four months after I left the staff of the Council of Economic Ad- 
visers. 
5.  Morgan based his analysis and recommendations on Murcbison and Solomon (1983). It is 
quite clear that their goal was promoting the flow of capital from the United States to Japan, rather 
than the reverse; their list of suggested measures for Reagan to urge on Nakasone included, e.g., 
“an increase in the Government  of Japan’s overseas borrowing with the proceeds converted imme- 
diately into yen to assist Japan in financing its substantial budget deficits” (pp. 25-27). 
6. Undersecretary Sprinkel had testified as recently as the preceding April that there was no 
merit to the theory that the Ministry of Finance was using capital  controls to keep the yen underval- 
ued. A study by  the General Accounting Office released the same month found the same thing. 
On the other hand, Secretary of State George Shultz did in private propose something very much 
like the yeddollar campaign in the summer of 1983. But he recognized that the State Department 
was obliged to leave exchange rate matters to the Treasury. 300  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Tokyo short-term  interest rates that arbitrage was able to eliminate the onshore- 
offshore differential that existed prior to that date. In the early 1980s, the ob- 
jective of the Japanese authorities was, if anythmg, to dampen the depreciation 
of the yen, not to promote it.7 Thus, it could have been predicted-and  was 
predicted (Bergsten 1984; CEA 1984; and Frankel 1984)-that,  if the Ministry 
of Finance were to agree to U.S. demands to avoid any remaining interference 
with international financial flows, the impact would be an acceleration of capi- 
tal outflow attracted by  higher interest rates in the United States, rather than 
the reverse. 
To be sure, other motives for the liberalization campaign were very relevant 
as well. From the beginning, the appeal of the idea to Don Regan and others 
in the administration lay in the political need to be seen beginning to respond 
to public and congressional  concerns over the rising U.S. trade deficit (particu- 
larly in a presidential election year) and the desire to do so in a way consistent 
with free market ideology. As the first instance of the Treasury attempting to 
respond to the trade deficit issue via exchange rate policy, in order to fend off 
protectionist pressures, the yeddollar campaign anticipated the Plaza Accord 
by almost two years. To this extent, the plan made perfect sense politically.8 
Two varieties of the free market argument are potentially quite sensible. One 
is that the point of the exercise was to promote the internal efficiency of the 
Japanese economy. This is apparently one of the things that U.S.  officials had 
in mind later when they spoke of the Yen/Dollar Agreement as having been a 
success and cited it as a model for the 1990 Structural Impediments Initiative 
with Japan or woddollar talks with Korea. The typical reaction of an outsider, 
however, is that the Japanese would not appear to need any advice from the 
United States on how to run their economy, while the typical reaction of  an 
American would be that the goal of U.S.  policy should be to promote the 
competitiveness of the American economy relative to Japan, rather than the 
reverse. 
The remaining argument is that the point of the campaign was to promote 
better treatment in Japan of U.S. banks, securities  companies, and other provid- 
ers of financial services. Several measures of this sort indeed appeared on the 
list that Regan discussed with Finance Minister Noboru Takeshita on 10 No- 
vember 1983, on the occasion of President Reagan’s visit to Japan, and in the 
May 1984 agreement. This component of the campaign is perfectly analogous 
to Reagan administration  pressure on Japan at that time to allow, for example, 
the free import of beef and citrus products. There is no question that the initia- 
tion of the yeddollar campaign in October 1983 gained political momentum 
when New York  financial institutions responded to a Treasuxy invitation to 
7. For evidence that the Japanese government in the early 1980s sought to resist the depreciation 
of the yen against the dollar, not to exacerbate it, see CEA (1984),  Frankel (1984, 16-25),  Funa- 
bashi (1988,89-92), GAO (1984), and Haynes, Hutchison, and Mikesell (1986). 
8. I describe below the switch in Treasury emphasis toward bringing down the dollar after James 
Baker succeeded Don Regan as secretary in January  1985 (see also Funabashi 1988,75ff.). 301  Exchange Rate Policy 
contribute a wish list of proposed measures. There is also little question that 
the measures that were adopted worked on U.S. service exports in the desired 
dire~tion.~  But my claim is that the objective of helping U.S. providers of  fi- 
nancial services was secondary to the objective of affecting capital flows and 
the exchange rate. 
5.1.5  The “Bubble,” June 1984-February  1985 
From mid-1984 to February 1985,  the dollar appreciated another 20 percent. 
This final phase of the currency’s ascent differed from the earlier phases, not 
only in that the appreciation was at an accelerated rate, but also in that it could 
not readily be explained on the basis of  economic fundamentals, whether by 
means of  the textbook theories or otherwise. The interest rate differential 
peaked in June and thereafter moved in the wrong direction to explain the 
remainder of  the upswing. Two influential studies were written, to the effect 
that the foreign exchange market had been carried away by an irrational “spec- 
ulative bubble” (Krugman 1985; Marris 1985; Cooper 1985).’O The trade defi- 
cit reached $112 billion in 1984 and continued to widen. Many who had hith- 
erto supported freely floating exchange rates began to change their minds. 
Attitudes in the administration  began to shift subtly in one respect. Treasury 
officials (both in public and in private) had previously denied that the large 
federal budget deficit and the trade deficit were problems or that the United 
States was becoming dependent on the foreign capital inflow to make up the 
shortfall in national saving.” But, toward the end of the first Reagan adminis- 
tration, these officials began (explicitly) to admit that the budget deficit was  a 
problem and (implicitly) to admit that the country did indeed need to borrow 
9. Several qualifications can be noted. First, measures to help U.S. financial institutions were 
not in the interest of U.S. manufacturing (and, for this  reason, did not  appear in the original 
Murchison-Solomon [I9831 report). Second, in contrast to recent U.S. efforts to include services 
in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, these measures may not have been in the interest of 
promoting the existing liberal international trade regime, as they were negotiated bilaterally and 
the benefits (such as the decision by  the Tokyo Stock Exchange to make seats available) often 
accrued more to U.S. financial institutions  than those of third countries. Third, one variety of the 
“Yanks hoodwinked again” school argues that the wily Japanese somehow used liberalization to 
attain more benefits for ?heir banks in the United States and Europe than they granted to US. 
banks operating in Japan. Of  course, standard theories of the “gains from trade” say that both 
countries can benefit simultaneously from liberalization. 
10. Contemporaneous statements by economists  that the dollar was greatly overvalued included 
presentations by Krugman, Bergsten, and Richard Cooper  to a prominent Federal Reserve System 
conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, just one month before the Plaza meeting. Another refer- 
ence on “the dollar as an irrational speculative bubble” that dates from this year is Frankel and 
Froot (1990). 
11. Some, particularly Destler and Henning (1989,29), attribute the May YeniDollar Agreement 
to a desire on the part of Treasury officials to make it easier for Americans to borrow from Japan. 
But this argument dates the borrowing motivation too early and attributes too much consistency 
to Treasury behavior. As of the spring of 1984, these officials were still claiming that the United 
States did not need to borrow from abroad to finance a shortfall of saving. The motivation in the 
YeniDollar Agreement was, rather, the one noted above: to try to decrease the yeddollar exchange 
rate and reduce the U.S. trade deficit, which is diametrically opposed to the motivation of increas- 
ing the net flow of capital from Japan to the United States. 302  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
from abroad to finance the deficits, and they took steps to facilitate such bor- 
rowing. In July 1984, Assistant Secretary David Mulford moved to make it 
easier for U.S. corporations to borrow from abroad, by eliminating the with- 
holding tax on payment of  interest to foreign residents, and allowed bearer 
bonds to be issued in the Euromarket. In September 1984, the Treasury created 
a new kind of bond that was specially targeted so as to appeal to foreign invest- 
ors and sent Undersecretary Sprinkel to Tokyo and various European capitals 
to help drum up customers for these bonds. But these measures did not consti- 
tute a decision that the strong dollar and trade deficit presented a problem. 
When it was no longer possible to postpone the choice between allowing the 
saving shortfall to keep interest rates high (thereby crowding out the interest- 
sensitive components of  U.S.  demand, so as to protect the exchange rate- 
sensitive components) and allowing it to keep the dollar high (thereby crowd- 
ing out net exports, so as to protect the interest-sensitive  sectors), in late 1984 
the Regan-Sprinkel team finally opted for the latter alternative de facto. In- 
deed, the increase in attractiveness of U.S. assets that was brought about by 
the July policy changes by Treasury furnishes virtually the only change in eco- 
nomic fundamentals that could conceivably help explain the appreciation of 
the dollar over this period when interest rates were falling. 
5.1.6  The Plaza Sea Change, 1985 
The pivotal event in the making of exchange rate policy in the 1980s was the 
shift from a relatively doctrinaire laissez-faire policy during the first Reagan 
administration  to a more flexible policy of activism during the second adminis- 
tration. In later sections, I will consider the extent to which economics, poli- 
tics, and personalities combined to produce this shift and the extent to which 
the shift in policy was  in turn responsible for the reversal of  the dollar's 
appreciation. 
An obvious point from which to date the switch is 22 September 1985,  when 
finance ministers and central bank governors from the G-5 countries met at the 
Plaza Hotel in New York and agreed to try to bring the dollar down.'* The 
Plaza Accord was certainly the embodiment of the new regime. But I would 
prefer to date the start of the new era from the beginning of  that year. With 
the inauguration of the second Reagan administration, Don Regan and Beryl 
Sprinkel left the Treasury (for the White House and the Council of Economic 
Advisers, respectively). James Baker became secretary of  the Treasury, and 
his aide Richard Darman became deputy ~ecretary.'~  Both men had already 
12. The story of the Plaza is described in detail in Funabashi (1988,9-41). 
13. The deputy secretary job that Darman took had previously been occupied by Tim McNamar. 
(McNamar did not quite have either Sprinkel's zeal for free market ideology or Regan's zeal for 
the exercising of power and in any  case did not play a central role in exchange rate policy.) The 
position of undersecretary for monetary  affairs was not filled after Sprinkel's  departure. Thus, 
Darman de facto succeeded Sprinkel in the area of exchange rate policy. David Mulford continued 
in the next-lower rank as assistant secretary for international affairs throughout the remainder of 
the second Reagan administration and was eventually promoted to a new position of undersecre- 
tary for international affairs in the Bush administration. 303  Exchange Rate Policy 
developed at the White House a reputation for greater pragmatism than other, 
more ideological members of the administration.  In January confirmation hear- 
ings, Baker explicitly showed signs of the departure with respect to exchange 
rate policy, stating at one point that the Treasury’s previous stance against inter- 
vention was “obviously something that should be looked at” (Destler and Hen- 
ning 1989,41-42). 
Another reason to date the change from early in the year is that the dollar 
peaked in February and had already depreciated by 13 percent by the time of 
the Plaza meeting. Some, such as Feldstein (1986), would argue that the gap 
in timing shows that exchange rate “policy” had in fact little connection with 
the actual decline of the dollar, which was instead determined in the private 
marketplace regardless of what efforts governments made to influence it. But, 
notwithstanding  that official policy did not change until September,14  there are 
two respects in which the bursting of the bubble at the end of February may 
have been in part caused by policy change. 
First, it was widely anticipated that Baker and Darman would probably be 
more receptive to the idea of trying to bring down the dollar than their prede- 
cessors had been. If  market participants have  reason to believe that policy 
changes to reduce the value of the dollar will be made in the future, they will 
move to sell dollars today in order to protect themselves against future losses, 
which will have the effect of causing the dollar to depreciate today. 
Second, some intervention was agreed on at a G-5 meeting attended by 
Baker and Darman on 17 January and did take place subsequently (see Funa- 
bashi  1988, 10).IJ The U.S.  intervention was small in magnitude.I6 But the 
German monetary authorities, in particular, intervened heavily to sell dollars 
in foreign exchange markets in February and March.I7  The February interven- 
tion was reported in the newspapers and, by virtue of timing, appears a likely 
candidate for the instrument that pricked the bubble. It is in turn likely that the 
accession of Baker to the Treasury in January and the G-5 meeting were the 
developments that encouraged the Germans to renew their intervention efforts 
at that time. 
The German authorities could claim credit for the reversal of policy. (So, for 
that matter, could the French, who had long and consistently been arguing in 
favor of foreign exchange intervention.) Looking back, Baker instead got the 
14. A June 1985 meeting of G-10 deputies in Tokyo, e.g., concluded that there was no need for 
international monetary reform and also endorsed the 1983 finding of the Jurgensen Report (Report 
ofrhe Working Group 1983) that intervention did not offer a very useful tool to affect exchange 
rates (Obstfeld 1990; and Dobson 1991). 
15. Surprisingly,  the G-5 public announcement on 17 January used language that, on the surface 
at least, sounds more prointervention than was used later in the Plaza announcement: “in light of 
recent developments in foreign exchange markets,” the G-5 “reaffirmed their commitment made 
at the Williamsburg Summit to undertake coordinated intervention in the markets as necessary.” 
16. A total of  $659 million in foreign exchange purchases from 21 January to  1 March, as 
compared to $10 billion by the major central banks in total (Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York 
Quarterly Review 10 [Spring 19851: 60; and 10 [Autumn 19851: 52). 
17. Intervention was particularly strong on 27 February and appeared to have an impact on the 
market (e.g.,  Wall Srreer Journal, 23 September 1985,26). 304  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
credit in public, perhaps because of his skill at receiving favorable coverage 
from the U.S. media and the extent to which political perceptions in the 1980s 
asymmetrically tended to radiate from Washington, D.C., out to the rest of the 
world, rather than vice versa. 
In April, at an Organization of  Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) meeting, Baker said, “The US is prepared to consider the possible 
value of hosting a high-level meeting of the major industrial countries” on the 
subject of international monetary reform. This trial balloon never went much 
further, despite similar proposals in the Congress (Putnam and Bayne 1987, 
199). Monetary issues were not extensively discussed at the Bonn Summit of 
G-7 leaders in May.‘* 
On 22 September, however, the G-5 ministers, meeting at the Plaza, agreed 
on an announcement that “some further orderly appreciation of the non-dollar 
currencies is desirable” and that they “stand ready to cooperate more closely 
to encourage this when to do so would be helpful,” language that by the stan- 
dards of such communiquCs  is considered (at least in retrospect) to have consti- 
tuted strong support for concerted intervention,  even though the word interven- 
tion did not appear. A figure of  10-12  percent depreciation of the dollar over 
the near term had been specified as the aim in a never-released “nonpaper” 
drafted by Mulford for a secret preparatory meeting of G-5 deputies in London 
on 15 September and (according to American government sources) was ac- 
cepted as the aim by the G-5 ministers at the P1a~a.l~  There was, apparently, 
little discussion among the participants as to whether changes in monetary 
policy would be required to achieve the aim of depreciating the dollar. 
On the Monday that the Plaza announcement was made public, the dollar 
fell a sudden 4 percent against a weighted average of other currencies (slightly 
more against the mark and the yen). Subsequently, it resumed a gradual depre- 
ciation at a rate similar to that of the preceding seven months.20  Interest rates 
continued to decline gradually, despite fears of Volcker and many others that a 
18. History records that the G-7 summit of May  1985 was overshadowed by the public relations 
disaster of Bitburg, which arose when President Reagan embarrassingly found himself committed 
to visiting a German cemetery that contained graves of Nazi SS soldiers (Putnam  and Bayne 1987, 
200-201).  History will neither confirm nor deny the report that this mistake on the part of the 
White House advance team was an indirect consequence of the strong dollar. On the afternoon 
when aide Michael Deaver should have been inspecting the Bitburg cemetery, he and other White 
House aides reportedly were instead out buying BMWs (Bovard 1991, 316), which at the time 
could be had in Germany for half the U.S. price as the result of the appreciation of  the dollar 
against the mark. 
19. The “nonpaper”  also specified the total scale of intervention  to be undertaken over the subse- 
quent six weeks (up to $18 billion) and the allocation among the five countries (Funabashi 1988, 
16-21).  Intervention actually undertaken by  the end of October turned out to be $3.2 billion on 
the part of the United States and $5 billion on the part of the other four countries, plus over $2 
billion on the part of  G-10 countries that were not represented at the Plaza, particularly  Italy 
(Federal  Reserve Bunk of New York Quarterly Review 10 [Winter 1985-861:  47). 
20. Because the rate of depreciation in the six months after the Plaza was no greater than in the 
six months before the Plaza, Feldstein (1986) argued that the change in policy had no effect. This 
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depreciation might discourage international investors from holding dollars and 
thereby force interest rates up.21  Before long, the Plaza had widely become 
considered a great public success. 
5.1.7  The Apotheosis of International Coordination, 1986 
Baker’s  ambitions for joint international policy-making concerned more 
than just exchange rates. His efforts to get Japan, Germany, and other trading 
partners to agree to expand their economies go back to negotiations leading up 
to the Plaza (Funabashi 1988, 11-12,  36-38;  Putnam and Bayne 1987, 205; 
Wall Street Journal, 23 September 1985, 1, 25). At the next summit of  G-7 
heads of state, held in Tokyo in May  1986, the United States persuaded the 
others to adopt a system of so-called objective indicators. The list of indicators 
included the growth rate of GNP, the interest rate, the inflation rate, the unem- 
ployment rate, the ratio of  the fiscal deficit to GNP, the current account and 
trade balances, the money growth rate, and international reserve holdings, in 
addition to the exchange rate. The plan was to expand the existing G-5 finance 
ministers’ meetings to include Italy and Canada and to agree in each meeting 
on a set of quantitative  predictions/goals  for each of the indicator variables. At 
subsequent meetings, each of the seven economies’ performances would be 
judged against those goals. In the words of the Tokyo Economic Declaration, 
the finance ministers and central bankers would “make their best efforts to 
reach an understanding on appropriate remedial measures whenever there are 
significant deviations from an intended course.” 
Mulford, as an unnamed Treasury source, indicated to the press that G-7 
members were supposed to feel substantive “peer pressure” to modify their 
policies so as to meet the agreed-on goals. The other countries suspected that 
the U.S. Treasury’s aim in setting up this system was to pressure them into 
greater economic expansion, as a way for the United States to reduce its trade 
deficit without itself having to undertake unpleasant fiscal retrenchment. The 
Germans spoke out against the “robotization” of international policy-making. 
The maneuvering that went on outside G-7 meetings in 1986 was more sub- 
stantive than  the maneuvering that  went  on inside. Baker was  repeatedly 
quoted in the press as ‘‘talking the dollar down,” in large part as a weapon to 
induce the trading partners to cut interest rates. This was a tack very much 
reminiscent of an earlier Treasury secretary, Blumenthal. The pitch went some- 
thing like this: “We would prefer that you expand your economies and thereby 
import more from us so that reduction of the U.S. deficit can be achieved in a 
way  consistent with growth for all parties. But, if  you  are not willing to go 
along, then I am afraid we are just going to have to let the dollar depreciate 
more, in which case your exports to us will fall.” 
The Germans and Japanese intervened in the foreign exchange market to try 
to support the dollar but complained that “these efforts were in vain, not least 
21. The role of Volcker and monetary policy during this period is discussed in sec. 5.6 below. 306  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
because statements by U.S. officials repeatedly aroused the impression on the 
markets that the U.S. authorities wanted the dollar to depreciate further. More- 
over, until then [the Louvre Accord in late January 19871 the Americans hardly 
participated in  the  operations to  support their  currency”  (Report of  the 
Deutsche Bundesbank for  the Year 1984, quoted in Obstfeld 1990,227). Mean- 
while, Fed Chairman Volcker was also being quoted as favoring the current 
level for the exchange rate, in apparent opposition to Baker. 
By September 1986, the yeddollar rate had declined from its peak of 260 
to about 154. Japanese exporters were feeling heavily squeezed. At an unan- 
nounced rendezvous in San Francisco, Japanese Finance Minister Kiichi Miya- 
zawa met with Baker. They made a deal under which the exchange rate would 
be stabilized in its current range, and in return the Japanese would undertake 
greater fiscal expansion. The agreement was not announced until October. In 
the interim, the yen had depreciated back to about 162 yeddollar. The Ameri- 
cans suspected the Japanese of deliberate manipulation so as to lock in a more 
favorable rate and returned to talking down the dollar. This episode is an ex- 
ample of the difficulty of enforcing an international cooperative agreement if 
its terms are not made explicit and public from the beginning to allow partici- 
pants and outside observers to judge compliance. 
5.1.8  The Louvre Accord and the Return of Dollar Stability 
The next meeting of G-7 finance ministers was held at the Louvre in Paris 
on 21-22  February 1987. The Baker-Miyazawa agreement proved to be some- 
thing  of  a  dry run  for the Louvre Agreement. The ensuing communiqut 
showed that the United States had agreed that the dollar should be stabilized 
“around current levels,” and in return Japan had agreed to expand domestic 
demand in general, and Germany and some of the others had agreed more 
narrowly to cut taxes. One interpretation as to why Germany and the others 
were willing to participate at the Louvre when they had not been earlier is that 
the  Baker-Miyazawa agreement demonstrated the readiness of  the United 
States and Japan to proceed with a “G-2,” and the Germans and the others did 
not want to be left out.** 
Two questions of importance for evaluating the Louvre Agreement concern 
quantitative bands and intervention. The communiquk that was released after 
the meeting, as with all G-7 meetings, contained little hard information and 
conveyed the major policy change with a few understated words: “The Minis- 
ters and Governors agreed that the substantial exchange rate changes since the 
22. Standard economic theories of the gains from coordination do not explain why a country 
should necessarily mind if other countries enter into an agreement without it. (Indeed, in  many 
cases, the excluded countries should in theory be able to reap the benefits from worldwide eco- 
nomic expansion, enhanced monetary stability, or some other “public good:’  without having to 
bear any of the burden.) But there must be some loss of power or prestige from being left out, 
because it is a commonly expressed subject of concern. Italy, which at the Tokyo  Summit of May 
1986 had  won an  expansion of the  G-5 ministers group to  the  G-7  (Putnam and Bayne  1987, 
208-9),  refused to join in the Louvre communiquC, in protest against its exclusion from an infor- 
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Plaza Agreement will increasingly contribute to reducing external imbalances 
and have now brought their currencies within ranges broadly consistent with 
underlying economic fundamentals.. .  . Further  substantial exchange  rate 
shifts among their currencies could damage growth and adjustment prospects 
in their countries.” As with the Plaza Accord, participants denied to the press 
that any specific quantitative  target range had been set (Wall Street Journal, 23 
February 1987,3). Subsequent newspaper reports spoke of the range or target 
zone that had been set at the Louvre and made guesses as to what it might be. 
Most knowledgeable observers surmised that probably no explicit quantitative 
range had in fact been agreed on. This view was overturned, however, when 
Funabashi (1988, 183-87)  reported that the Louvre participants had after all 
set a “reference range” of 5 percent around the current 
The advantage of having kept the target range secret was borne out when 
the dollar broke out of the lower end of the range. By April 1987,  the scheduled 
time of a G-7 meeting, the yen-dollar rate had fallen 7 percent from the Louvre 
baseline. The Japanese finance minister, Miyazawa, was  forced to  accept 
Baker’s proposal to “rebase” at the current level of  146 yeddollar, with the 
same width of the reference range bands as before. 
The U.S.  commitment at the Louvre to oppose further depreciation of the 
dollar might be supposed to show up in three ways, besides the announcement 
of the agreement itself: an absence of statements by the secretary of the Trea- 
sury “talking down the dollar,” purchases of dollars in foreign exchange inter- 
vention operations, and a tighter monetary policy. From then on, Baker did 
indeed refrain, for the most part, from talking down the dollar. For the first 
time since the heavy dollar sales of  1985, the United States also did indeed 
intervene substantially in the foreign exchange market in the aftermath of the 
Louvre, buying dollars to discourage further depreciation.  Finally, U.S. interest 
rates did indeed begin a gradual rise in February (reversing a three-year down- 
ward trend), although the Federal Reserve was motivated more by a desire to 
choke off inflation, which was beginning to edge up slightly again, than by a 
feeling of commitment to support the value of the dollar. Perhaps as a result of 
these three steps, the dollar appreciated, particularly against the mark, from 
the date of the Louvre until mid-March (at one point inducing a small amount 
of Fed intervention in March to dampen the appreciation). 
5.1.9  The Financial Markets Fear a Dollar Plunge, 1987 
Many analysts had been warning for some time of the possibility of a “hard 
landing,” which could be defined as a fall in the dollar that, because it is caused 
by  a sudden portfolio shift out of dollar assets, is accompanied by  a sharp 
23. More precisely, a narrower margin of 2 2.5 percent, after which point intervention would 
be called for on a voluntary basis, and a wider margin of  -C  5 percent, at which point a collabora- 
tive policy response would be obligatory. Such meetings are notorious for each country emerging 
with its own view as to what was agreed on, and there is always the possibility that the 5 percent 
target range was a U.S.  proposal about which some countries, such as  Germany, were unenthusias- 
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increase in interest rates that have a contractionruy effect on economic activity 
(e.g., Marris 1985).’” 73~0  events shook financial markets in 1987;  each of them 
began with markings of  such a portfolio shift. First, in the spring, a fall in 
demand for U.S. bonds, perhaps led by nervous foreign investors, led to a de- 
preciation of the dollar (despite concerted intervention  in support of the dollar) 
and an abrupt decline in bond prices and increase in interest rates. 
Second, world stock markets crashed on 19 October 1987. Of the various 
possible causes that  have  been proposed  for the bursting of  the apparent 
bubble, several are international in nature. By the fall of  1987, the U.S.  trade 
deficit still had not impr0ved,2~  and Jim Baker was again hoping to convince 
the largest trading partners to expand their economies. On  15 October, the 
Commerce Department reported an unexpectedly large August trade deficit, 
and the New York stock market reacted with a then-record ninety-five-point 
fallz6  On 18 October, Baker again called on the German minister, Stoltenberg, 
to undertake expansion, with renewed dollar depreciation as the threatened 
alternative. When the U.S.  and other stock markets crashed on the next day 
(508 points in the case of New York), two possible causes that were identified 
were the 14 October trade deficit announcement and Baker’s threat to the Ger- 
mans to let the dollar fall. A third hypothesis is that the markets feared that the 
Fed would deliberately  raise interest rates to try to keep the dollar from falling 
through a floor set at the Louvre (Feldstein 1988a; Obstfeld 1990).27 
On 19 October, many observers at first feared that the hard landing was at 
hand. But, in large part owing to the rapid reaction of the Federal Reserve, 
interest rates fell rather than rose, and there was no subsequent slowdown in 
economic activity. The Fed was prepared to allow a sharp decline in the dollar 
if the alternative were insufficient liquidity to avert a financial crisis; although 
the dollar, surprisingly, did not depreciate on 19 October. 
Consultations among the various governments began immediately, but, in 
the absence of  a clear idea as to what macroeconomic policy commitments 
could be made, with respect to U.S. fiscal policy in particular, no G-7 meeting 
was scheduled. Dollar depreciation was again a concern, with frequent inter- 
vention in support of the dollar having little apparent effect. Two months after 
the stock market crash, G-7 representatives decide4 in a “Telephone Accord” 
to try to breathe new life into the Louvre Agreement. Paragraph 8 of their 22 
24. This was also a major concern of Paul Volcker’s. 
25, In retrospect, the trough in the dollar trade deficit occurred in the third quarter of  1987 (and 
the trough in the “real trade deficit,” i.e., the quantity of exports minus the quantity of imports, in 
the third quarter of 1986). 
26. Other immediate market reactions that day included a decline in the dollar and an increase 
in short-term interest rates, precisely as in the portfolio-shifthard-landing scenario (WuU  Street 
Journal, 5 November 1987,22). 
27. This explanation was partly inspired by  Chairman Greenspan’s move to raise interest rates 
earlier in the year. But Greenspan’s motivation was probably to respond to incipient signs of re- 
emerging inflation, particularly to demonstrate his independence from the administration and to 
earn his tough-guy credentials in the eyes of the market soon after his appointment to replace Paul 
Volcker, more than to meet any exchange rate commitment made by Baker at the Louvre. 309  Exchange Rate Policy 
December 1987 communiquk (which the G-7 leaders were later to repeat word 
for word in the communiquk of the Toronto Summit in June 1988) modified 
slightly earlier statements in favor of exchange rate stability. It included new 
wording: “Either excessive fluctuation of exchange rates, a further decline of 
the dollar or a rise in the dollar to an extent that becomes destabilizing to the 
adjustment process, could be  counterproductive (Dobson  1991, table 4.8, 
p. 65; New York limes, 8 January 1988,26). The asymmetry of the language, 
describing  the undesirability of a rise in a more qualified way than the undesir- 
ability of  a fall, was a deliberate signal that the group wanted to put a floor 
under the dollar at its current level. The markets were initially unimpressed, 
but heavy around-the-clock intervention in support of the dollar**  in January 
1988 was apparently quite effective at combating dollar weakness. 
Periodically in 1987 and 1988, Japan’s Ministry of Finance used administra- 
tive guidance to encourage Japanese institutional investors to hold more U.S. 
assets than they might choose on profit-maximizing grounds, in order to keep 
the dollar from depreciating further than it already had by then. This happened, 
in particular, in response to the U.S.  bond market fall in the spring of  1987. 
Koo (1988,8) tells us, “Even though the imposition of such quasi-capital con- 
trols [reporting  require-ments for Japanese banks handling foreign exchange- 
and an implicit threat behind them-imposed  in May 1987 to head off a dollar 
collapse] was against the spirit of the Yen/Dollar Committee sponsored  jointly 
by the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the US Treasury to deregulate Japa- 
nese financial markets, no complaints were heard from the US” (see also Hale 
1989,2-4). 
5.1.10  Dollar Rallies, 1988 and 1989 
The dollar began to appreciate after the intervention of  January 1988. Its 
strength in mid-1988, leading up to the November presidential election, led 
some observers to suggest that the authorities in Japan and Germany were sup- 
porting the U.S. currency in order to help candidate George Bush win the elec- 
tion and thus head off the danger of protectionist trade policies under the Dem- 
ocrats. 
A new dollar rally followed in 1989. For the first time since 1985-86,  the 
official message switched from a desire for “exchange rate stability around 
recent levels” back to an implication that the current strength of the dollar was 
not justified (Dobson 1991, table 4.8, p. 66): in the communiquk of a Washing- 
ton meeting in September 1989, the G-7 “considered the rise in recent months 
of the dollar inconsistent with longer run fundamentals.” 
The yen, in particular, weakened against the dollar at the end of the decade, 
28. Called the “G-7 bear trap” by Destler and Henning (1989,66).  The intent of the intervention 
was to “bridge” until substantial improvements  in the U.S. trade deficit materialized, at which time 
market sentiment in favor of the dollar could take over. In the event, this plan worked quite well 
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in association with political scandals in Japan in 1989 and an investor shift out 
of  Japanese security markets in  early  1990. Japanese officials apparently 
thought that, having supported the U.S. currency earlier, the Americans should 
now return the favor and support the yen. U.S. authorities had bought yen and 
marks in 1988 and 1989 to dampen the appreciation of the dollar. But a Paris 
G-7 meeting in early April 1990 produced no support for Japan (beyond a 
statement that the ministers had “discussed . . .  the decline of the yen against 
other currencies, and its undesirable consequences for the global adjustment 
process” [Dobson 1991, table 4.8, p. 661). 
5.1.1  1  Exchange Rates Policies in Other Parts of the World 
Most political discussion of “the dollar” does not bother to distinguish what 
partner currencies are intended or what their relative weight is in the basket. 
Some standard weighted average of the major industrialized countries is usu- 
ally used  when precise numbers are needed, while the  mark  and-espe- 
cially-the  yen often come in for extra attention, by virtue of the importance 
of Germany and Japan in international trade and finance. The lack of American 
concern with other currencies stems in part because the various dollar ex- 
change rates are highly correlated and in part because the less-important cur- 
rencies are considered esoteric in the U.S. political Sphere.29  Nevertheless, 
some specific issues concerning other currencies did arise in the 1980s and are 
worth mentioning both as they relate to the dollar and to the extent that they 
shed  light on  American  thinking regarding  foreign  exchange markets in 
general. 
First, after the LDC debt crisis surfaced in August 1982,  it became necessary 
for many countries in Latin America and elsewhere to take policy steps to 
convert their existing trade deficits into trade surpluses and thereby earn the 
foreign exchange to service their international debts. High on the usual list of 
such policy steps is the devaluation of the currency. The Mexican peso, Brazil- 
ian cruzeiro, Argentine peso, and many others underwent repeated large nomi- 
nal and real devaluations. For the most part these devaluations were compo- 
nents of policy packages taken under the guidance, indeed insistence, of the 
International Monetary Fund and with the full support of the U.S. government. 
But demurs were occasionally  heard from two different sources within the U.S. 
political galaxy. A few U.S. industries that faced competition from these coun- 
tries charged that the devaluations represented subsidies or other unfair trading 
practices and were sometimes supported in these charges by protectors in the 
Commerce Department or in the Congress. An  example was charges by  the 
U.S. copper industry that they faced unfair competition from Chile in the form 
of a devaluation of the Chilean peso. 
The  other source of  protest was  more philosophical than  political: the 
“supply-siders”  argued that devaluation, like fiscal austerity (the twin officially 
29. Recall the famous quote from the Nixon tapes, “I don’t give a -  about the lira.” 311  Exchange Rate Policy 
sanctioned policy for problem debtors), was not an effective or desirable way 
to improve the trade balance because it had no real effects. The supply-sider 
viewpoint deserves attention-if  for no other reason than that it was repre- 
sented in the Reagan administration, especially at the beginning, with suffi- 
cient vigor, for example, to produce the 1981-83  tax cuts. 
Another major nondollar currency development of the 1980s was the move- 
ment toward enhanced monetary and financial unification within Europe. The 
founding of the European Monetary System (EMS) by Giscard and Schmidt 
in  1979 had been portrayed at the time as something of  a challenge to the 
primacy of the dollar, and policy toward the EMS at the U.S.  Treasury had 
been at best neutral.3O But, when “Europe 1992” frenzy caught fire in Europe 
in  1988 and generated some fears of a “Fortress Europe” in the American 
Congress, media, and business communities, the attitude of the administration 
ranged from indifferent to benign. This benign indifference particularly char- 
acterized the decade’s developments on the monetary side: France’s retreat 
from the go-it-alone expansion and controls on capital outflow that the Social- 
ists had instituted in 1981, the agreement by EMS members to phase out all 
capital controls by July 1990, and the completely unanticipated decision by 
East and West Germany in 1990 to undertake monetary ~nification.~~  All three 
events tended to be welcomed as further signs of the worldwide free market 
revolution that Ronald Reagan had helped start. 
The Europeans, however, often feel that the U.S. policymakers are insuffi- 
ciently appreciative of EMS concerns, for example, of the way that the long- 
awaited depreciation of the dollar in 1985 might put strains on the cross-rates 
between the deutsche mark and the weaker currencies in the EMS. After the 
Plaza Accord, Treasury officials thought that the Germans had not done their 
agreed-on share of intervention. This view was expressed by Mulford at a G-5 
deputies meeting in Paris in November 1985. The Germans explained that the 
Bank of Italy had sold over $2 billion in place of  the Bundesbank so as to 
avoid putting upward pressure on the lirdmark cross-rate. They considered 
American reluctance to accept this explanation to be a sign of  indifference to 
the EMS (Funabashi 1988,27-30). 
A third area of the world that featured interesting exchange rate develop- 
ments was the East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs): Korea, Tai- 
wan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Here U.S. policy played a determining role. 
In 1986 and 1987, there became fashionable the view that the explanation for 
the lack of improvement in the U.S. trade balance since February 1985 was 
that the traditional indices of the U.S.  “effective exchange rate” vastly over- 
stated the depreciation of the dollar that had taken place, by giving excessive 
30. Funabashi (1988,31) explains views within the Treasury. 
3 1. One striking development of  1990 that was presumably in large part a consequence of the 
fall of Communism in Central Europe was the appreciation of the mark  and other European cur- 
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weight to the yen and European currencies: that such trading partners as the 
East Asian NICs, Brazil and Mexico (newly important competitors in manu- 
factures) and  Argentina, Australia and  Canada (traditional competitors in 
wheat and beef in third-country markets), had little or no representation in the 
indices and that their currencies had not appreciated against the d~llar.’~ 
The two countries that came in for particular attention were Korea and Tai- 
wan. (Singapore and Hong Kong were relatively exempt from criticism be- 
cause both follow free trade policies. The Latin American countries had the 
excuse of difficult debts to service.). As of 1986, the new Taiwan dollar had 
only begun to appreciate against the U.S. dollar, and the Korean won still had 
not begun to do so, even though both countries had large trade surpluses. The 
U.S. government soon began to apply pressure on the two (as Fred Bergsten 
first urged in Seoul in July 1986), and the currencies were in fact allowed to 
appreciate relatively strongly. In the periodic reports to Congress required by 
the Omnibus Trade Bill of  1988, the Treasury focused heavily on Korea and 
Taiwan. In the October 1989 report, the Treasury announced the beginning of 
negotiations that went beyond simply pressuring Korea to appreciate the won, 
to push for a general liberalization of Korean financial markets and conversion 
to a market-oriented foreign exchange system, presumably meaning a regime 
of free fl~ating.’~  There was a general appeal to the superiority of free market 
principles and a citation of the precedent of the yeddollar talks. 
5.2  Competing Economic Theories 
Policies that are adopted are naturally the outcome of the positions held by 
various interest groups and policymakers and their interactions through the 
political process and their relative power. Secs. 5.4 and 5.5 of the paper discuss 
the competing interest groups and policymakers. Sec. 5.3 discusses the various 
possible positions regarding exchange rate policy among which they choose. 
In the area of exchange rates, the links from policy tools to the determination 
of the exchange rate, and even the links from the exchange rate to the economic 
welfare of various groups, are not entirely certain. For this reason, the differing 
models or views as to how the foreign exchange market (and the rest of  the 
economy) operates can be as relevant as differing economic interests in de- 
termining the positions taken by  various actors. Thus, in this section I begin 
with a brief discussion of alternative  exchange rate theories. 
32. A few economists at regional Federal Reserve banks initially overstated the case by includ- 
ing  the  Latin  American countries in  a comprehensive nominal  exchange rate  index  and  pro- 
claiming that  the depreciation of the  dollar had  in fact not taken place! A properly  computed 
comprehensive real exchange rate index shows that the  1985-87  depreciation of  the dollar was 
less than  one would think  if the  other countries were  not included but that  the difference was 
not large. 
33. Korea agreed to move to a so-called Market Average Rate system in March 1990 (see Fran- 
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5.2.1  Trade Balance Equilibration 
A regime of purely floating exchange rates has held roughly for the United 
States since 1973 and held precisely in the early 1980s. Under such a regime, 
the exchange rate is determined in the private market and adjusts to clear 
supply and demand for foreign exchange without any intervention  by the mon- 
etary authority. An old-fashioned view of exchange rate determination is that 
the supply and demand for foreign exchange are dominated by exports and 
imports (respectively) so that under floating rates the exchange rate adjusts so 
as to clear the trade balance. What makes this view old-fashioned is that for- 
eign exchange markets today are dominated by financial transactions, rather 
than by trade, and have been ever since the major industrialized countries re- 
moved their major controls on the international  flow of capital. The importance 
of international capital flows explains why the record U.S. trade deficits of the 
mid-1980s did not immediately produce an equilibrating depreciation of the 
dollar: the deficits were easily financed by  massive borrowing from abroad. 
Some observers, however, professed to be surprised by this development and 
argued that the magnitude of the U.S. trade deficit in itself was evidence that 
floating exchange rates were not operating “as they were supposed to” and that 
some reform was therefore called for (Murchison and Solomon 1983). 
One consequence of the trade balance equilibration view is the implication 
that, if one country adopts a policy change that differs from that of its neigh- 
bors (e.g..  the fiscal expansion adopted by  the United States in the 1980s), 
under a floating exchange rates the effects are felt entirely within the domestic 
economy, rather than being in part transmitted abroad, for example, via a do- 
mestic trade deficit and foreign trade surplus. It would in turn follow that, un- 
der floating rates, there is little need for international coordination of macro- 
economic policy of the sort agreed on at the Louvre. 
Large international capital flows are the most important of  several ways in 
which this old-fashioned “insulation” result can be invalidated. Nevertheless, 
for the case of changes in monetary policy, leading multicountry econometric 
models suggest that it is in practice not far wrong to think that the exchange 
rate adjusts so as to produce little effect on the trade balance and little intema- 
tional transmission (Frankel 1988a). For fiscal policy, on the other hand, the 
trade balance and transmission effects are typically even greater under floating 
exchange rates than under fixed rates. Thus, it is no surprise that record US. 
trade deficits and European trade surpluses emerged beginning in 1983 or that 
calls for international coordination of policy followed. 
5.2.2  Monetarism 
For many, the most commonsensical  modem view of international monetary 
economics was that of the monetarists. Among the relevant tenets of moneta- 
rism are (i) a belief in the central role of  the money supply, particularly for 
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and stable growth in the money supply, so as to give price stability; (iii) suspi- 
cion of the motives and abilities of the Federal Reserve Board and an axiomatic 
belief that the country is more likely to get the proper sort of monetary policy 
if the Fed is brought more directly under the control of the political process 
(i.e.. Congress or the Treasury); (iv) faith in free markets in general; and (v) 
extension of the free market philosophy to include the virtues of a freely float- 
ing exchange rate so that any country that prints too much money has to bear 
the burden itself in terms of inflation and currency depreciation. This last, the 
belief in floating exchange rates, was a position that Milton Friedman (1953) 
had advanced almost alone, at a time when such a change in the exchange rate 
regime seemed a remote pipe dream. 
The monetarists entered the 1980s riding high. Largely as a response to the 
inflation of the 1970s and the other failures of Keynesian economics, the views 
of Milton Friedman and his followers had gone from those of an outlandish 
minority to wide acceptance and had supposedly been adopted as official pol- 
icy by the Federal Reserve Board. At long last, a member of the Shadow Open 
Market Committee, Beryl Sprinkel, was appointed undersecretary for mone- 
tary affairs (1981-84),  the position in the Treasury that traditionally has had 
responsibility not only for monetary affairs but for the exchange rate and other 
matters of  international finance as well, and  another, William Poole,  was 
appointed to the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (1982-85). 
It was downhill from there. Intellectually, the monetarists were soon faced 
with the breakdown of their most cherished relation, that between money and 
prices. The big fall in velocity in the early 1980s caused the Federal Reserve 
Board to abandon its monetarist rule (in mid-1982 de facto, and several years 
later explicitly). Politically, their champion Sprinkel, who duly lectured the 
Fed from 1983  to 1986 that its rapid rate of money growth would soon produce 
a resurgence of inflation, was overruled by the secretary of the Treasury, who 
sought to pressure the Fed forfaster growth, for the usual reasons of political 
expediency, particularly in the election year, 1984. This spectacle must have 
been an edifying lesson for the monetarists on the political economy of mone- 
tary policy. (Refer back to tenet iii above.) 
In interagency meetings and public appearances, Sprinkel tried to explain 
the appreciation of the dollar as due to the administration’s success at bringing 
down the rate of inflation. Such a factor could explain a nominal appreciation 
but not the real appreciation of the dollar in the early 1980s,  which was almost 
as big as the nominal appreciation (as is readily apparent in fig. 5.1 above). 
Nor, for that matter, could the monetarist view explain the clear observed in- 
crease in real interest rates. With both the relation between money and prices 
and the relation between the price level and the exchange rate breaking down, 
the monetarists were in heavy retreat by the latter part of the decade. Sprinkel 
was not happy with the Treasury’s 1985  conversion to managed exchange rates, 
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5.2.3  Overshooting 
The theory that could readily explain an increase in the real interest rate and 
a real appreciation of the dollar was the mainstream textbook macroeconomic 
view subscribed to by Feldstein and Volcker, among others. As explained in 
sec. 5.1 above, the two variables are closely associated: the increase in the real 
interest differential signals an increase in the expected rate of return on dollar 
securities; international investors respond to the enhanced attractiveness of 
dollar securities by increasing their demand for them, which causes the dollar 
to appreciate. The elegant seminal statement of this process was the overshoot- 
ing model of Dornbusch (1976). In the overshooting equilibrium, everyone in 
the market agrees that the dollar has become “overvalued” in the sense that its 
current value is greater than its long-run value and that it will have to depreci- 
ate in the future; the market’s expectation that the dollar will depreciate in the 
future is just sufficient to offset the higher interest rate that dollar assets pay, 
with the result that investors view dollar and nondollar securities as equally 
attractive in this equilibrium. 
The overshooting model had some major difficulties of its own. Although 
the model could account for the fact of the dollar appreciation and for the 
magnitude (at least as of early 1984), it could not explain the duration of 
the appreciation, a long, drawn-out process that lasted until February 1985. 
In theory, the appreciation should have occurred in one jump (e.g., when the 
magnitude of the budget deficits became known), or in two  jumps (e.g., begin- 
ning with the monetary contraction of  1980), or at most in four or five jumps 
(as bits of information on the monetary/fiscal policy mix came out). It should 
then have begun its gradual return to long-run equilibrium. As described in 
section 5.1.5 above, from mid-1984 on, far from beginning its return to long- 
run equilibrium, the dollar continued to appreciate at an accelerated rate, in 
the face not only of an ever-worsening trade balance but of  a real interest dif- 
ferential that had begun to diminish as well. It appeared that the dollar was 
“overshooting the overshooting equilibrium.” This was  definitely n&  how 
floating exchange rates were supposed to behave, and observers increasingly 
began considering alternatives. 
5.2.4  New Classical Macroeconomics 
It was clear that the last 20 percent real appreciation of the dollar up to 
February 1985 could not be correlated with readily observable, standard, mac- 
roeconomic fundamentals. That left two possibilities. The first theory, coming 
from the new classical macroeconomic school, says that movements in the real 
exchange rate come from fundamental shifts in “tastes and technology” that 
may not be observable. Although most proponents of the new classical school 
are notorious for omitting to suggest what the specific fundamental shifts 
might be in any particular episode, others have suggested that Reagan reduc- 316  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
tions in tax rates, especially on capital income, could be the explanation  behind 
the appreciation of the dollar in the early 1980s (e.g., Dooley and Isard 1985; 
Bovenberg 1989).” 
This school of thought provides the most respectable intellectual foundation 
for the “safe-haven” view of the strong dollar that was so prevalent in the first 
Reagan administration.  But many observers find it implausible that there could 
have been a shift in taste toward American goods or an increase in U.S. produc- 
tivity, or tax effects, sufficiently large to explain an upswing in the value of the 
dollar as large as that from mid-1984 to February 1985, only to be reversed 
rapidly thereafter. At the Plaza in September 1985, the Treasury abandoned the 
previous line that the value of the dollar was an indicator of American eco- 
nomic strength. One obvious motivation was the awareness that the downward 
trend that had appeared over the preceding six months would, under this theory, 
be interpreted as evidence of American economic weakness.35 
5.2.5  Speculative Bubbles 
The second possibility is that the final stage of appreciation of the dollar in 
February 1985 was an example of  a speculative bubble: a  self-confirming 
increase in the value of &e dollar arising from purchases of dollars by  spec- 
ulators who think that it will appreciate. The standard theory of  speculative 
bubbles has the advantage that it can be perfectly consistent with rational ex- 
pectations: a speculator cannot necessarily expect to make money from the 
knowledge that the market is in a bubble because he does not know when the 
bubble will burst. But the standard version of the theory has the disadvantage 
that it has nothing to say about what gets such speculative bubbles started. 
Recent formulations of fads and speculative  bubbles that are not necessarily 
rational focus on the existence of  different classes of  speculators: one class 
that forecasts on the basis of macroeconomic fundamentals and another that 
just tries to guess which way  the rest of the market is going. The apparently 
perverse increase in the demand for dollars in 1984-85, for example, might be 
explained by the decreased confidence that speculators were placing in funda- 
mentalists’ forecasts of future depreciation and the increased confidence that 
they were placing in the extrapolations of  “technical analysts” (Frankel and 
Froot 1990; Krugman 1985; Marris 1985).36 
5.2.6  Portfolio Balance 
For present purposes, the most important aspect of  the portfolio-balance 
model is that it adds a policy tool: its says that even sterilized foreign exchange 
34. This view was also put forward by CEA members Niskanen and Poole in the 1985 Economic 
35. In  this sense, Secretary Baker was jumping on the bandwagon rather than leading it. 
36. Technical analysts, also known as “chartists,”  use such atheoretical techniques as  extrapolat- 
ing past trends in the exchange rate by noting whenever the short-run moving average crosses the 
long-run moving average. 
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intervention, that is, intervention that does not change money supplies, can 
affect the exchange rate. The reason is that investors are assumed to view long 
positions taken in various currencies as imperfect substitutes for each other, 
even if they are not holding actual foreign currency. Other approaches, such as 
the monetarist model, by  contrast, are quite firm that only to the extent that 
intervention changes money supplies (in which case it is just a species of mon- 
etary policy) can it have an effect. This is the position Beryl Sprinkel took, for 
example, when his French counterpart Michel Camdessus tried to argue the 
desirability of foreign exchange intervention in preparations for the 1982 sum- 
mit of G-7 heads of state at Versailles (Putnam and Bayne 1987, 133). 
Another aspect of the portfolio balance approach is that it implies that, al- 
though trade balance equilibration is not operative in the short run, it is opera- 
tive in the long run. Because a deficit country must borrow to finance its deficit, 
the accumulation of international indebtedness over time will eventually force 
its currency to depreciate. Some would say that mounting indebtedness is what 
finally forced the dollar down during the period 1985-87. 
5.3  Competing Views on Desirable Exchange Rate Arrangements 
Differing models as to how the foreign exchange market operates translate 
into different views as to the appropriate government response. But it is not a 
one-to-one correspondence. 
5.3.1 
There are four principal variants of the school of thought that says that the 
government should allow the foreign exchange market to function freely on its 
own. The most extreme position, held by  monetarists and the new  classical 
school, says that there is no need to be concerned about exchange rate fluctua- 
tions because they have no real effects. The simplest form of this argument 
claims that movements in the real exchange rate are nonexistent because move- 
ments in the nominal exchange rate serve only to offset differences in inflation 
rates. But this view steadily lost adherents as the 1980s progressed because it 
was evident that the nominal appreciation of  the dollar was almost fully re- 
flected as a real appreciation of the dollar. The more sophisticated form of the 
argument (the new classical view, mentioned above) holds that, although there 
clearly are real fluctuations in the exchange rate, these are fluctuations due to 
real changes in productivity or tastes and would have taken place anyway, even 
if  the exchange rate had not been freely floating. An increasing number of 
observers also found this view harder to swallow in 1984-85,  but the vote was 
far from unanimous. 
Even among the large majority who agree that exchange rate movements 
have real effects on the trade deficit and other important variables, there are 
other viewpoints that lead to the conclusion that the government should refrain 
from interfering. One is the view that exchange rate movements are the natural 
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result of  changes in macroeconomic policy and may actually be desirable if 
one takes the changes in policy as given. In the case of  the 1982-84  dollar 
appreciation,  attributed to the widening federal budget deficit, the question was 
whether the dollar appreciation was desirable if one took the budget deficit as 
a given political constraint. 
CEA Chairman Feldstein argued that it was. The strong dollar acted as a 
“safety valve” to distribute the crowding-out effects of the budget deficit more 
evenly among sectors of the private economy. The Feldstein doctrine (so chris- 
tened by Fred Bergsten) held that, even if policymakers were somehow able to 
force the dollar down without changing fiscal (or monetary) policy-for  ex- 
ample, by sterilized foreign exchange intervention or capital controls-the  fa- 
vorable effects on the export- and import-competing sectors would be more 
than offset by unfavorable effects: the lost capital inflow would result in real 
interest rates even higher than those prevailing at the time, which would hurt 
those sectors of the economy (such as capital goods) where demand is sensitive 
to the real interest rate. The result would be a “lopsided recovery” (CEA 1984; 
Feldstein 1984). 
One related viewpoint refuses to take fiscal and monetary policy as given. 
It argues that exchange rate targets or other financial gimmickry can deflect 
political resolve to deal with budget deficits and other domestic objectives that 
ultimately may be more important than the exchange rate or the trade balance.37 
Another argues that, if central banks are encouraged to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market, they will gamble away the taxpayers’ money, to little 
A final viewpoint is that floating rates allow a greater degree of policy indepen- 
dence among countries that do fixed rates or managed floating (even if they do 
not allow complete insulation as held by the trade balance equilibration view) 
and that such decentralization of national policy-making is best because each 
country is the best judge of its own needs (Corden 1983). 
5.3.2  Commit Monetary or Fiscal Policy to Helping Stabilize the 
Exchange Rate 
The argument that allowing the full effect of the mix of monetary and fiscal 
policies to be reflected in the exchange rate maximizes the chance that those 
policies will be adjusted appropriately has a mirror-image argument on the 
other  side: committing countries to  exchange rate  targets maximizes the 
chance that monetary and fiscal policy will be appropriate. 
Many believe that the government should commit to some degree of stabili- 
zation of the exchange rate. One of the more prominent and practical proposals 
is the Williamson proposal for target zones. Part of the argument for making 
37. A counterargument that places more weight on the exchange rate and trade balance objec- 
tives is based on the political economy point that Congress tends to  adopt damaging protectionist 
policies when a dollar appreciation increases the trade deficit. Bergsten (1982, 1984), e.g., argued 
that, for such reasons, the exchange rate objective should be given increased weight. 
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such a commitment is that, even though macroeconomic policies will ulti- 
mately have to be adjusted in order to keep the exchange rate within the band, 
such adjustment is desirable. Williamson (1983, 1987) has argued, for ex- 
ample, that, if target zones had been in place in the early 1980s, the Reagan 
administration would have been forced to abandon its policies that were pro- 
ducing excessive budget defi~its.3~ 
5.3.3  Attempt to Decouple the Exchange Rate from Other 
Macroeconomic Policies 
For anyone aware simultaneously of the trade costs of an overly strong dol- 
lar, the inflationary consequences of an expansionary monetary policy to de- 
preciate the dollar, and the political difficulties  in cutting the U.S. budget defi- 
cit, any sort of policy instrument that could bring about a depreciation of the 
dollar without changing monetary or fiscal policy would be a godsend. A few 
such instruments have been proposed. 
Although steriEized intervention has no effect on the exchange rate in the 
view of many because by definition it does not change money supplies, it can 
have an effect if it changes expectations regarding future money supplies or if 
the portfolio-balance model is correct. At the Versailles Summit of 1982, the 
French argued that foreign exchange intervention did provide an independent 
and useful tool; the Americans agreed to form an intergovernmental working 
group to study the question (and to enact a process of  “multilateral surveil- 
lance” by the Group of  5). The findings of the working group, known as the 
Jurgensen Report (Report of  the Working Group 1983), were submitted to the 
G-7 leaders at the Williamsburg Summit of 1983. 
Although the Plaza Accord is widely perceived as having strikingly  reversed 
the position of the G-7, particularly the United States, on the question of the 
effectiveness  of intervention,  there was in fact no discussion in the Plaza delib- 
erations or in  the communiquk as to whether  the intervention undertaken 
should be sterilized or not. Indeed, there was not much discussion at the major 
meetings as to what sort of monetary policies would be appropriate to support 
exchange rate objectives. The exception is that the Plaza Accord called for 
Japanese monetary policy to “exercise flexible management with due attention 
to the yen exchange rate” (Funabashi 1988, 265; Dobson 1991, table 5.1, p. 
82). When the Bank of Japan raised its discount rate soon after the Plaza, it 
claimed a reduction in the yeddollar rate as its objective, although others were 
less sure that this was truly its motive. 
Concerted intervention, that is, by  all or most of the G-7 central banks si- 
multaneously, is reported to be more effective. There is indeed some evidence 
that the whole may be greater than the sum of the parts, especially if the inter- 
39. Feldstein, on the other hand, has countered that, if a serious target zone had been in place 
in the early  1980s. the government would not have reacted to the dollar appreciation by  cutting 
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vention is announced to the public and if  it reinforces a movement that is 
already under way (Dominguez and Frankel 1991; see also Mussa 1981). 
Capital controls were used by the United States to lessen downward pres- 
sure on the dollar before 1973 and by  Germany and Japan to stem upward 
pressure on their currencies. Some, such as Tobin (1978), Bergsten (1984),  and 
Dornbusch (1986), proposed in the early 1980s that the U.S. reimpose controls 
to stem capital inflow or that Japan be urged to strengthen its controls on capi- 
tal outflow (rather than being pressured to remove them). It was also suggested 
that the Japanese government could and did use administrative guidance to 
discourage Japanese investors from holding dollar assets in the early 1980s or 
to encourage them to hold dollar assets in 1987-88. 
Most economists viewed these various instruments as unlikely to be very 
effective, in  the  absence of  changes in  monetary  or  fiscal policy.  Many 
practitioners, however, believed that they could have an effect, at least in the 
short run. 
5.3.4  Fix the Exchange Rate 
For some countries (small and open), a fixed exchange rate may be a practi- 
cal option. Here one of the major arguments for fixing the rate is to commit 
monetary policy to a noninflationary policy in a way that is sufficiently credi- 
ble to workers and financial markets that reduced expectations of inflation help 
eliminate actual inflation. For a country like the United States, a fixed ex- 
change rate is no longer a very viable option.4O 
Nevertheless, a special case of a fixed exchange rate system, the gold stan- 
dard, was frequently proposed by a certain influential  group, the supply-siders. 
The same Wall Street Journal editorial writers who brought us the Laffer curve 
in the area of tax policy also brought us the Mundell-Laffer  hypothesis (which 
claimed that changes in the nominal exchange rate were one for one and in- 
stantly offset by changes in price levels so that devaluations had no real effects) 
and the proposal that monetary stability could be restored only by returning to 
a regime where the central bank made a commitment to peg the price of gold. 
This view had important adherents in the starting team at the Treasury in 1981. 
But, in March 1982, the Gold Commission that had been appointed to investi- 
gate such proposals submitted a negative report. By  1983, only the moderate 
Manuel Johnson, at the assistant secretary level, was left among the original 
supply-siders at Treasury, When Johnson was appointed vice-chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board at the beginning of  1986, joining other recent ap- 
pointees perceived as favoring easier money, some feared that gold standard 
proponents had taken over. But, like Thomas B Becket after he was appointed 
archbishop of Canterbury, the historical integrity of the institutional prevailed, 
and Johnson became a model of central banker rectitude. 
40. McKinnon (1988), however, continued to offer specific versions of his proposal for a return 
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The administration continued to be susceptible to penetration by a minority 
of gold bugs, however. Laffer came to meetings of an academic advisory group 
in the White House, gold-bug think tanks like Jude Wanniski’s firm Polyco- 
nomics and the Lehrman Institute were heard from frequently, and Congress- 
man Jack Kemp was always a rival for the attentions of Conservative Republi- 
can  supporters. At  the  October  1987 annual meeting of  the  IMF,  Baker 
proposed that the G-7 add to its list of indicators the price of  “a basket of 
commodities, including gold.” This proposal was accepted by the G-7 at the 
Toronto Summit in June 1988, although without the explicit reference to gold, 
which Baker had included in his speech to outflank congressional gold bug 
Kemp. 
5.4  Competing Interest Groups 
fected by the exchange rate. 
5.4.1  Manufacturing 
U.S. manufacturers were clearly hurt by the appreciation of the dollar in the 
early 1980s, losing export customers around the world and losing domestic 
customers to competition  from a flood of imports.4l In contrast to smaller, more 
open countries, exchange rate policy in the United States had not traditionally 
been a high priority in the list of issues on which the manufacturing sector 
would lobby in national politics. But, during the period 1983-85,  as the value 
of the dollar continued to climb to new heights and the trade balance continued 
to sink to new lows, an increasing number of business groups and chief execu- 
tives from large corporations lodged complaints in Washington and urged 
action. 
Lee Morgan, chairman of Caterpillar Tractor in the early 1980s, stands out 
as an example of activism on the exchange rate issue, both in terms of  the 
consistency and the earliness (starting as early as December 1981 [testimony 
before a House committee cited in Funabashi 1988, 701) of his efforts and in 
terms of their policy payoff. The Illinois maker of construction  equipment was 
engaged in intense competition for customers around the world with a Japa- 
nese rival, Komatsu. Morgan realized that, as a major American exporter, his 
interest lay with outward-oriented trade policies rather than protectionism. But 
he also realized that taking measures to reduce costs at Caterpillar would not 
be sufficient to maintain international competitiveness if  they were offset by 
appreciation of the dollar. 
Morgan’s influence went far beyond that of the CEO of a typical large corpo- 
ration. He could claim to be a spokesman for the business community, heading 
In this section, I consider some of the major economic interest groups af- 
41. Branson and Love (1988) provide statistical evidence on the sectoral effects of the strong 
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a task force of the influential Business Roundtable, which took a strong posi- 
tion on the exchange rate beginning in 1983. Furthermore, he personally had a 
degree of access to top policymakers  that went beyond that of a typical political 
supporter.42  In repeated meetings with administration cabinet members (the 
first one was in the White House in October 1982), Morgan argued for an 
activist exchange rate policy. 
For the first two years, such lobbying by the Business Roundtable and others 
(the National Association of Manufacturers “AM]  was also vocal on the need 
for policies to bring down the dollar) appeared to have little or no effect on 
policy. But, as described in section 5.1.4 above, Lee Morgan’s visit to the White 
House and Treasury in late September 1983 (with Murchison and Solomon) 
was the impetus for Don Regan’s entire yeddollar campaign. By the beginning 
of  1985, the number of voices from the U.S. manufacturing sector protesting 
the administration’s neglect of the dollar and the trade deficit had multiplied 
greatly. This was certainly a major influence on the thinking of Baker and Dar- 
man when they finally shifted the administration  to an activist position on the 
exchange rate. 
The Business Roundtable was usually careful to say that measures to try to 
bring down the dollar should not be taken in isolation, that measures to reduce 
the federal budget deficit were an important part of the package. An interesting 
question was whether the economic interest of American manufacturing lay on 
the side of efforts to bring down the dollar, if one took the budget deficit as a 
fixed political constraint. In the widely accepted analysis of  Feldstein, mea- 
sures that did not  try to work through macroeconomic policies (say, capital 
controls, foreign exchange intervention, or public statements)-even  if effec- 
tive at bringing down the dollar and reducing the trade deficit-would  reduce 
the capital inflow and raise U.S. interest rates. The crowding out would be 
borne less by  exchange rate-sensitive  industries and more by  interest rate- 
sensitive industries. 
Neat  theoretical distinctions regarding  sector sensitivities tend to break 
down, however, as soon as one recognizes that many of the industries that are 
most sensitive to the exchange rate are the same as the ones that are the most 
sensitive to the interest rate: autos, aircraft, and capital goods in general. This 
may explain-if  one is willing to attribute enough sophistication to business 
leaders-why  many of them did not devote much energy to the exchange rate 
issue until the bubble period of late 1984 and 1985, when the dollar seemed 
divorced from economic fundamentals: until then, the trade-off between high 
42. The Reagan administration was said by  insiders to owe a large political favor to Morgan 
and his company, as one of three American  suppliers that had heavily lost business when the 
government  instituted an  embargo on equipment being used in the  construction of the  USSR- 
Europe gas pipeline beginning in December  1981. (Caterpillar  lost sales of two hundred pipe 
layers [Nollen 1987, 71). It was also relevant that Caterpillar’s hometown (Peoria) had House Mi- 
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interest rates and a high dollar had been regarded as inexorable, given the bud- 
get deficit. 
The manufacturing leaders who had been complaining about administration 
neglect of  the dollar all praised the Plaza Agreement of  September 1985. 
Some, like NAM, continued to call for a weaker dollar in 1986 and 1987 and 
in particular to call for appreciation by Taiwan, Korea, and other NICs. But, in 
the late 1980s, the exchange rate was no longer a salient enough issue to rouse 
most  of  the business community to political action (Destler and Henning 
1989, 130-31). 
5.4.2  Agriculture 
The agricultural sector is quite sensitive to the exchange rate. In theory, the 
effect on the farmer comes directly through the price that he or she receives 
for his or her product: a 10 percent increase in the value of the dollar causes 
an immediate 10 percent fall in the world price of the crop when expressed in 
dollars. In practice, subsidies and other distortions in almost every country 
partially insulate farmers from the international  market. But inflationary mone- 
tary policies, together with specific agricultural  policies, encouraged American 
agriculture to expand output and exports in the 1970s, with the result that, by 
the 1980s, they had indeed become quite dependent on exports. 
The switch in the monetary/fiscal policy mix in the early 1980s and the 
appreciation of the dollar put strong downward pressure on dollar commodity 
prices. Existing farm support programs reduced the impact on the farmer by 
buying up large quantities of  unwanted crops and making support payments 
that in some years were as large as total net farm income. But the existence of 
the large accumulated government holdings of  commodities kept prices de- 
pressed for some years after the macroeconomic situation began to reverse in 
the mid-l980s, with the result that the effect of the programs was to spread the 
negative effect out over time (not to mention inflict high costs on consumers) 
rather than just to dampen it. The rural sector considered  the 1980s a disastrous 
decade for it, and there was much talk of  a bifurcated economy, with service- 
oriented California and the Northeast doing well and everybody in between 
(both the Rust Belt and the Farm Belt) doing poorly. 
Farm lobbies came out in favor of a depreciation of the dollar, and Agricul- 
ture Secretary Block was one of the voices in cabinet meetings in  1983-85 
who were concerned about the policy mix, the dollar, and the trade deficit. 
Agrarian populists consistently favor easier money, lower interest rates, and a 
weaker dollar. Ninety years ago they were championed by presidential candi- 
date William Jennings Bryan, who campaigned against the “cross of gold,” the 
commitment to the gold standard that was keeping money tight. In the early 
1980s, a return to the gold standard was seen as a way of getting easier money 
by supply-siders like 1984 presidential candidate Jack Kemp (Frankel 1986). 
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Federal Reserve Board: Wayne Angell, who, at the time, was considered to be 
in favor of easy money. One observer has included the Farm Aid movement as 
one of  the pressure groups that in  1985-86  successfully protested the high 
dollar and trade deficit, leading to a switch to policies of intervention in the 
foreign exchange market and easier money.43 
Although the agricultural sector was clearly in the camp opposed to the 
strong dollar, it did not expend a great deal of lobbying time or expense on this 
particular issue. Obvious explanations include that  lobbying resources ex- 
pended directly on farm legislation had a greater payoff, and that a serious 
attack on the macroeconomic source of  the appreciation (the budget deficit) 
would likely include cut-backs on farm subsidies (Destler and Henning 1989, 
124). But there is another possible reason why efforts to bring down the dollar, 
even taking the budget deficit as given, may not have been clearly in the farm 
sector’s interest: interest rates. The high real interest rates that resulted from 
the 1980s switch in macro policy mix were as much a source of negative pres- 
sure on commodity prices (via low inventory demand) and of financial distress 
for farmers (many of whom were heavily in debt) as the high dollar. Thus, the 
commodity sector faced the same trade-off between interest rates and the dol- 
lar as such industries as capital goods, autos, and aircraft an effort to bring 
down the dollar without  changing macro policies-even  if successful-would 
be a mixed blessing in that it would probably lead to even higher interest rates. 
5.4.3  Labor 
In classic Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade theory, the interests of labor and 
capital (or land) should line up on opposite sides, according to whether the 
manufacture of exports and imports is intensive in their use. In practice, their 
interests seem to fit better the “specific-factor’’  model. Auto workers and auto 
capitalists, for example, both have a lot invested in the auto industry and thus 
ally themselves more closely with each other in questions of trade than with 
workers or capitalists, respectively, in other industries.44  In the case of  the 
strong 1980s dollar, this means that labor in the manufacturing sector was op- 
posed to the strong dollar in the same way  as managers and owners in that 
sector. 
Relative to the agricultural sector, labor had a head start in the sense that the 
trade deficit had already been a priority concern for some time (particularly  in 
the sectors badly hurt by  import competition in the 1970s: auto, steel, and 
textiles). The AFL-CIO, for example, came out against the administration’s 
neglect of  the dollar and its implications for the trade deficit in early 1984. 
But labor representatives gave less priority to the exchange rate issue than the 
business community did, in part because they tended to be more enamored of 
43. See Havrilesky (1990,57), who sees this episode as fitting a “public choice” theory of how 
44. See Frieden (1990, 13-19),  who argues that the steadily increasing degree of international 
monetary expansion follows after a period of redistributive policies. 
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industrial policy as an alternative antidote for the trade deficit (Destler and 
Henning 1989, 122-24). 
5.4.4  Sectors That Benefit from a Strong Dollar 
There are a number of  actors in the economy who benefit from a strong 
dollar, most obviously consumers, firms that import inputs (such as oil and 
semiconductors), and the importers themselves (including shipping, market- 
ing, and retail). The entire segment of the economy composed of goods and 
services that are not traded internationally clearly benefits from an increase in 
the price of their output in terms of the price of the internationally traded seg- 
ment of the economy. The strongest  case, in theory, is the construction  industry. 
In the first place, the tradable component there is close to zero. In the second, 
measures to force down the dollar at the expense of a cutoff in capital flows 
and an increase in real interest rates would hurt the construction sector more 
clearly than any 
All the sectors  just named during the strong-dollar  period were in fact silent 
on the exchange rate issue. Part of  the explanation is that constituents with 
grievances tend to speak louder in the political process than constituents who 
are benefiting from the current state of affairs. Much of the explanation is that 
the links from the exchange rate to their economic welfare are less tangible, 
certain, and well understood than is the case for the sectors hurt by the strong 
dollar. American consumers are notoriously unaware of  their own fondness 
for imports. 
In the case of interest-sensitive industries like construction, even though 
their lobbying representatives did not focus on international factors, they al- 
ways favored a reversal of the early 1980s pattern of  monetary contraction, 
fiscal expansion, and high real interest rates. Furthermore, the monetary au- 
thorities were fully aware that they would become a source of political pressure 
in the event that a cutoff of foreign capital inflows forced up interest rates. 
5.4.5 
Henning (1990, 41) argues that many U.S. banks were “unsympathetic to 
industry’s problems in the early 1980s. With far less leverage over the manage- 
ment of industrial enterprises than their foreign counterparts,  some bank CEOs 
hoped, with the Federal Reserve, that the appreciation  of the dollar would force 
rationalization and cost-saving upon what they perceived to be a spendthrift 
and undisciplined manufacturing sector.” 
At a large 1985  meeting sponsored by Congressman Jack Kemp and Senator 
Bill Bradley, some representatives of  the banking and financial community 
were among the few defenders of a laissez-faire exchange rate regime, against 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions 
45. Frieden (1991,448) argues that the Reagan administration’s polices may have been a deliber- 
ate response to  the interests of its “principal bases of support in the defense community, in real 
estate and related sectors, and in the international investors group,  [where] pressures were  for 
increased spending on nontradables.” 326  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
the many industrial executives and other participants who had gathered to rally 
around efforts to bring the dollar down. Lester Thurow declared that the issue 
was a syndrome familiar from the United Kingdom, in which the financial 
community in the City of London supports a strong currency while the manu- 
facturing cities support a weak currency. In American terms, it would be “Wall 
Street” versus “Main Street.” But John Bilson, a self-described Chicago cur- 
rency speculator,  responded that the issue is not a strong dollar versus a weak 
one but rather a highly variable dollar, from which currency traders profit, ver- 
sus a stable dollar, which industry finds more conducive. 
Foreign exchange trading is big business for banks, in terms of both volume 
(over $110 billion a day in 1989) and profit. Econometric causality tests sug- 
gest that higher exchange rate volatility leads to higher dispersion of opinion 
across market participants (as reflected in survey data) and that higher disper- 
sion in turn leads to a higher volume of  trading (Frankel and Froot 1990). 
Exchange rate volatility is also clearly in the interest of those who make their 
living trading foreign exchange futures and options on the Philadelphia and 
Chicago Mercantile Exchanges; these instruments did not even exist under the 
fixed exchange rate system that ended in 1973. In short, one could explain on 
simple self-interest grounds a tendency for the financial community to be more 
supportive of floating rates than the rest of the country. 
Two  representatives of  the financial community, in particular, spoke out 
against the government’s 1985 switch toward trying to stabilize exchange rates. 
In 1986, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange formed a group called the Ameri- 
can Coalition for Flexible Exchange Rates to lobby against exchange rate man- 
agement. In 1987 and 1988, the Economic Advisory Committee of the Ameri- 
can Bankers’ Association also offered public statements against interfering 
with floating rates (Destler and Henning 1989, 131-36). 
The large New York banks, however, for the most part stayed away from this 
sort of activity, and there is no reason to believe it had much impact (Destler 
and Henning 1989).46  Even though exchange rate volatility is a boon to the 
foreign exchange trading room, it can be a headache to bank divisions that 
deal with international borrowing and lending, in the same way as it is to the 
international operations of nonfinancial c0rporations.4~  In any case, lobbying 
the government in favor of volatility would be too antisocial a mode of behavior 
for most financial institutions to engage in. Henning (1990 p. 41) concludes 
that most bankers “neither actively opposed nor supported those corporate of- 
46. Destler and Henning explain that  one reason that much of the banking community viewed 
with concern Baker’s attempt to  manage exchange rates (at the  Louvre, in particular) is that  it 
would threaten the independence of the Fed in setting monetary policy. 
47. One view is that there is a relevant split wifhin  the financial community, between Chicago- 
based traders of futures and options, who profit from volatility, and the New York-based  invest- 
ment bankers, who-exercising  influence through the secretary of the  Treasury and Washington 
regulatory agencies-have  sought in recent years to reign in the freewheeling ways of the Mid- 
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ficials from the real sector who called for a depreciation of  the dollar in 
One place where the New York financial community has secured the help 
of the government is in putting pressure on countries in East Asia and else- 
where to open their financial markets to greater participation by  U.S. firms. 
Such issues would properly fall in the sphere of  trade policy rather than ex- 
change rate policy, but for the Treasury’s linking them to the campaign to ap- 
preciate the yen in 1984 and the won in 1988-90.  In the yeddollar talks, Don 
Regan put high priority, for example, on the Tokyo Stock Exchange making 
some seats available to American securities 
1982-85 .” 
5.5  Competing Policymakers 
A policy-making agency determines its stand on an issue on the basis in part 
of the ultimate goals of its constituents (e.g., low interest rates or a low dollar) 
and its perceptions of the link between policy instruments and economic goals. 
Actual policy is then determined by the interaction of the agencies with each 
other and with the media. 
5.5.1  The Federal Reserve Board 
In the United States, the Treasury has primary responsibility for interven- 
tion, while the Fed has official responsibility for monetary policy. Indeed, in 
practice the Treasury usually determines intervention in the foreign exchange 
market, even though the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is the agent that 
undertakes all intervention in a mechanical sense, and even though the foreign 
exchange reserves that are used are the Fed’s own as often as the Treas~ry’s.~~ 
Economic theory says that it should be virtually impossible to determine ex- 
change rate policy separately from monetary policy. But the politics of  this 
attempt at decentralized responsibility have their own logic. 
In 1984 and 1985, Volcker, concerned about the trade deficit, supported the 
idea of some amount of foreign exchange intervention to try to bring the dollar 
down. This put him in conflict with the Treasury, particularly with Regan and 
Sprinkel in 1984. There was little question of the Fed chairman trying to over- 
come Treasury objections to intervention; Volcker was well advised to save 
most of his ammunition to protect Fed independence on monetary policy and 
a bit to snipe at the fiscal policies that were at the root of the trade deficit. But 
48. The  first beneficiary turned out to be Menill-Lynch, the  company  of  which Regan  had 
previously been chairman (Frankel 1984,47). 
49. Over the  years, some Treasury officials have taken the position that the  secretary  of  the 
Treasury, as the  chief financial officer of the government, has the  ultimate legal authority over 
intervention even when it is conducted with the Federal Reserve’s own money. Fed officials like 
Paul  Volcker point out that  such claims are  not based in any legal statute, such as the Federal 
Reserve Act, which gives the  central bank  its independence, but  agree that the  Fed has  never 
challenged Treasury supremacy in  this area in practice and is unlikely to do so in the future. 328  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Volcker clearly welcomed Baker’s 1985 abandonment of the position that the 
strong dollar was a good thing. He did not view the Plaza as putting undesir- 
able constraints on monetary policy. 
Soon after the Plaza, the positions had switched, with the Treasury in favor 
of further depreciation of the dollar and Volcker warning of the dangers of a 
speculative run. The Fed had no choice but to go along when the Treasury 
wanted to intervene. But, during the remainder of the decade, the central bank 
played the traditional role of the party more concerned about the dangers of  a 
free-fall of the currency and an increase in inflation. 
By 24 February 1986, the balance of power at the Federal Reserve Board 
had swung away from Volcker in favor of the recent easy-money Reagan ap- 
pointees, who voted a reduction in the discount rate against the opposition of 
the chairman in a famous “palace coup.” Volcker then managed to persuade 
Governors Preston Martin and Wayne Angel1 to defer the discount rate cut until 
he could arrange similar coordinated cuts by the Bundesbank and the Bank of 
Japan. The explanation offered by Volcker was that a unilateral U.S. monetary 
expansion would cause the Plaza depreciation  to turn into an uncontrolled free- 
fall of the dollar.50  But it appears clear that Volcker was also looking for a way 
to avoid having been outvoted by his Board, a way to save face and thereby 
retain the effective leadership. The chairman retreated into the complexities of 
international finance, knowing that this was unfamiliar territory to the others. 
One lesson here is that the bonds of fraternity that existed between Volcker 
and his counterparts at the German and Japanese central banks were stronger 
than the relationship between him and the recent Reagan appointees. It was 
not long thereafter that Vice-Governor Martin resigned from the Board. 
In  1987 Greenspan inherited Volcker’s concern that a weak dollar policy 
would  be  an  inflationary policy,  while  in  1988 Nicholas Brady  inherited 
Baker’s concern that a strong dollar policy would be bad for growth and bad 
for the trade balance. Indeed, these actors were playing out the age-old conflict 
between central bankers and treasury ministers over whether money should 
be tight. 
Vice-chairman Manuel Johnson had responsibility at the Fed for dealing 
with other countries’ central banks (after the death of Henry Wallich and espe- 
cially after the resignation of Wallich’s replacement, Robert Heller). Johnson 
and Mulford reportedly came into more open conflict over the dollar than did 
Greenspan and Brady.  One story has it that, after a failure of  Johnson and 
Mulford to iron out differences in 1989  (Redburn 1990,63), Johnson in protest 
registered a technical objection to the way the Treasury was running exchange 
rate policy: a disproportionately  large share of the intervention was being con- 
ducted with the Fed’s reserves fund rather than with the Treasury’s own ex- 
50. Funabashi (1988,48-49) accepts the explanation that Volcker both knew more and cared 
more about the exchange rate  implications of such actions than did the other, more domestically 
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change stabilization fund. Later, in the aftermath of the Japanese stock market 
crash of early 1990, the Johnson-Mulford conflict resurfaced over whether the 
Fed or the Bank of Japan should be the one to ease. Johnson resigned in mid- 
1990, however. 
Most other countries, to a greater extent than the United States, vest respon- 
sibility for exchange rate policy and monetary policy with the same authority. 
But, when it comes to international discussions, the U.S.  “schizophrenia” 
seems to prevail. As noted above, the G-5 ministers, at the Plaza and subse- 
quently, did not discuss sterilization of intervention, or even monetary policy, 
when deciding to take action to try to affect the exchange rate. Whether or 
not intervention in reality offers a tool for affecting the exchange rate that is 
independent of monetary policy, the policy-making apparatus is set up as if it 
does: exchange rate policy is discussed by the G-5 and G-7 finance ministers, 
while monetary policy is discussed by central bankers, for example, at G-10 
meetings ten times a year at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel. 
Although the G-7 meetings would probably benefit from the attendance of the 
central bankers, the latter are not entirely sure that they want to be included. A 
system in which the politicians can be seen engaging in international  economic 
diplomacy in the public eye, without binding the monetary authorities to the 
policies that would logically be required if  the commitments to manage ex- 
change rates were interpreted literally, is a system that has attractions for both 
sets of actors. 
5.5.2 
In the years 1983-84,  the press contained many reports to the effect that 
CEA Chairman Feldstein was a lone voice of dissent within the administration, 
that the White House and the rest of the cabinet sided with the Treasury in 
maintaining that the deficit dollar problem was not a problem. In reality, Secre- 
tary of  Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Agriculture John Block, 
Special Trade Representative  (later Labor Secretary) William Brock, and Bud- 
get Director David Stockman  were all by 1984 speaking in cabinet and subcab- 
inet meetings on the damage done by the strong dollar.51  The president did not 
himself deal with policy issues as detailed as the value of  the dollar, in the 
sense of running or attending cabinet meetings on the subject. 
Secretary of State Shultz occasionally expressed a view in private, based on 
his own background as an economist. In a very low-key way, he arjyed within 
the administration for dollar depreciation as early as July  1983, including 
even  investigation of  a  possible “interest equalization tax” on capital in- 
The Rest of the Administration 
5 1. Nor did the president ever “discipline” Feldstein in any way  for failing to toe the line. This 
would simply not have been consistent with Reagan’s temperament. (Stockman [1986], e.g., re- 
veals that his own celebrated “trip to the woodshed” for speaking out on the budget deficit never 
in fact took place.) This allowed Feldstein to claim, truthfully, that he had as much right to claim 
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But Undersecretary for International Affairs Allen Wallis, the State De- 
partment representative at cabinet-level meetings on the dollar and the trade 
deficit, sided with the Treasury position that the strong dollar was good rather 
than bad. In any case, as already noted, Shultz recognized that dollar issues 
were the Treasury’s turf, not his. After 1985, with the depreciation under way, 
the tendency for other agencies to cede primacy on this issue to the Treasury 
was reinforced. 
5.5.3  Congress 
Throughout the 1980s, Congress evinced far more concern with the U.S. 
trade deficit than did the White House. In the political environment of Capitol 
Hill, denying that a problem like the trade deficit or the strong dollar is really 
a problem provokes strong attacks. Many hearings were held to underscore that 
these were in fact serious problems. Studies were commi~sioned.~~  The 11-13 
November 1985 conferences on the dollar organized by  Congressman Jack 
Kemp and Senator Bill Bradley (or, more accurately, entrepreneured by their 
former staffers Smick and Medley) was billed as a “U.S. Congressional Sum- 
mit” and had pretentions even more far reaching in scope: legislators and other 
representatives from foreign countries were invited, and the organizers also 
sought to associate Baker and Darman with the conference’s views on world 
monetary reform. Such activities had the effect of raising public consciousness 
of the exchange rate as an issue. 
The Congress was much more limited in the specific policy actions it could 
take, however. The one relevant sphere in which the Congress did have primacy 
was  trade legislation. Although this  alternative (perceived) means  of  ad- 
dressing the trade deficit was not directly relevant to the exchange rate, there 
were important political links. In April 1985, Senators John Danforth (R) and 
Lloyd Bentsen (D) took the position that the Congress should insist on plans 
for addressing the exchange rate problem as a prerequisite for granting the 
administration the “fast-track authority” it had requested for (what was to be- 
come) the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (Destler and Hen- 
ning 1989, 104-5). 
This case of specifically tying trade policy to the exchange rate issue was 
relatively rare. More often, congressmen simply responded to the record trade 
deficits by  proposing trade legislation that free traders in the administration 
found unpalatable, unintentionally exerting pressure on the Treasury to try to 
bring down the dollar and thereby the trade deficit. The threat of  mounting 
52. Shultz gave a speech at Princeton in the spring of  1985 that  some considered an important 
public reversal of the benign neglect policy of the first Reagan administration, setting the stage for 
the Plaza. 
53. As was hinted at in sec. 5.1.4 above, some of  Caterpillar Tractor Chairman Lee Morgan’s 
impact on exchange rate issues was exercised via his congressmen. For example, he persuaded 
Senator Charles Percy to ask the GAO to investigate charges of exchange rate manipulation on the 
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protectionism on Capitol Hill was certainly one of the major motivations for 
the Treasury’s 1985 turnaround on the dollar. The success of the Plaza initiative 
at forestalling protectionist legislation is the major respect in which Baker de- 
serves  credit  for  a  political  triumph, notwithstanding the  open  question 
whether the Plaza was in fact responsible for the dollar depreciation, and not- 
withstanding that the trade deficit did not in fact improve in dollar terms until 
1988 (and did not fall below its 1985 level until 1989). 
The Congress also began to pass resolutions and consider bills that required 
specific action on exchange rate policy. Of several bills submitted in mid-1985, 
a proposal by  Senator Bradley was the most specific. It would have required 
the creation of a “warchest” of intervention funds to be used according to the 
following rule: every time four consecutive quarters show a current account 
deficit in excess of 1.5 percent of GNP and a dollar at least 15 percent above 
the level corresponding to current account balance, the Treasury would be re- 
quired to purchase at least $3 billion in foreign currency over the subsequent 
quarter. Needless to say, the Treasury was disturbed by these open assaults on 
its right to make exchange rate policy. This threat from the Congress was an- 
other of the factors that contributed to Baker’s reversal of policy in 1985. 
Even after the Plaza, skeptical congressmen continued to press for system- 
atic reform of exchange rate policy.  More bills were proposed by  others, in- 
cluding Representative Stan Lundine (D), who, in the original version of his 
bill, proposed an explicit link between the exchange rate and  negotiating 
authority for the Uruguay Round. In December 1985, the House Banking 
Committee passed a compromise  bill that did not quantitatively mandate inter- 
vention, like the Bradley proposal, but did require the secretary of the Treasury 
to report to Congress twice a year on exchange rates, among other provisions. 
As Congress debated various bills to deal with the still-widening trade deficit 
over the subsequent three years, with the twist of increasing emphasis on the 
East Asian NICs rather than just Japan, proposals regarding exchange rates 
remained part of the debate (Destler and Henning 1989,99-111). 
The outcome, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of  1988, in- 
cluded a large subsection on exchange rate policy. In four areas, it called for 
Treasury activism and, as in the House Banking Committee  bill, required regu- 
lar Treasury reports to the Congress: “An assessment of the impact of the ex- 
change rate on the current account and trade balance, overall economic per- 
formance,  competitive  position,  and  indebtedness of  the  United  States; 
recommendations  for policy changes necessary to achieve a ‘more appropriate 
and sustainable’ current account balance; reporting of the results of bilateral 
negotiations with countries that manipulated their currencies; and analyses of 
exchange-market developments and their causes, including capital flows, and 
of  intervention, among other things (Destler and Henning 1989, 111-13).  In 
the  first four reports submitted subsequently, the Treasury understandably 
evaded as much as possible the injunction to specify exchange rate and current 
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“manipulate” their exchange rate, spending a very high percentage of the re- 
ports on Korea and 
5.5.4  The IMF and Other International Agencies 
The International  Monetary Fund has always conducted reviews of U.S. pol- 
icy in annual “Article IV”  consultations, as it does for any country. But the 
United States pays no attention whatsoever to these reviews.55 
The IMF did in the 1980s become involved in the G-7 process. When the 
G-7 leaders at the 1982 Versailles Summit instructed the G-5 finance ministers 
to undertake at their regular meetings multilateral surveillance of the interna- 
tional implications of the member countries’ policies, the managing director 
of the IMF was invited to participate. 
Previously, the OECD had been the body that had seen itself as providing 
the technical background for G-7 economic summits. This input in theory took 
place through a succession of meetings of  country officials that began with 
Working Party 3 (WP  3). In WP 3 in 1981-84,  and as Economic Policy Com- 
mittee (EPC) chairman in 1985-88, Beryl Sprinkel patiently explained to other 
countries’ finance vice-ministers and central bank governors (as well as to his 
own country’s delegation) the errors in their view of the chain of causality that 
ran budget-interest rate-capital flow-dollar-trade deficit. WP 3 reported to the 
Economic Policy Committee (EFT)  which normally designated as its chair the 
U.S. chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, in a mostly futile attempt 
to get the American team interested in the deliberations. The EPC in turn re- 
ported to ministerial meetings, which reported to the G-7 summit leademJ6 
The Americans (as well  as the  British) were reportedly unhappy  with 
“Keynesian” tendencies at the OECD and so began to place more emphasis on 
the IMF (Putnam and Bayne 1987, 161). Since 1986, when the G-7 leaders 
formalized surveillance with a system of indicators at the Tokyo Summit, the 
IMF Research Department has been entrusted with compiling the countries’ 
numbers. The G-7 ministers’ meetings begin with a presentation by the IMF 
managing director, providing an overview of the issues and his recommenda- 
tions. Exchange rate issues, however, are mostly treated outside this “surveil- 
lance” context (Dobson 1991, chap. 3). 
54. The results are described in Frankel (1993) and more briefly in sec. 5.1.11 above. 
55. In the  1984 consultation, when the Ih4F staff wrote a report that subscribed to the widely 
accepted view that the strong dollar and the trade deficit were problems caused by  the budget 
deficit and high real interest  rates, Sprinkel  responded in terms that suggested that it was the report, 
rather than U.S. policies, that needed to be evaluated. 
56. As CEA chairman in 1982-84,  Feldstein was chairman of the Economic Policy Committee. 
He  shared with many of  the other countries a belief in the deficit-dollar chain of causality, in 
opposition to Regan and Sprinkel. But Feldstein did not view the apparatus of international coop- 
eration (the OECD, the G-5 or the G-7, and summit meetings) as a particularly useful forum in 
which to mobilize support for correction of the U.S. fiscal deficit. He may have thought that, within 
the U.S. policy debate, allying with other countries’ governments was more likely to undermine 
one’s  stance politically than to reinforce it. (On  reasons to be skeptical of coordination, see also 
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As noted above, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Base1 is the 
venue for regular meetings among the G-10 central bankers. While the tightly 
knit group of central bankers operates at a distance from the bright lights of 
macroeconomic policy coordination and public pronouncements on exchange 
rates, they are able by telephone to coordinate the timing of intervention  opera- 
tions or changes in the discount rate more precisely than the finance ministers 
are able to coordinate anything. 
5.6  Theories of the Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy-Making 
A number of generalizations have been, or can be, hazarded regarding the 
making of exchange rate policy. 
5.6.1  The Switch from Benign Neglect to Activism as a Political Cycle 
The 1985 switch in Reagan administration attitudes toward the dollar was a 
complete about-face. (Administration spokesmen initially denied that there 
had been such a 180-degree change in course, but, as public approval of the 
Plaza grew, Baker accepted credit for it as a new policy initiative.) It would be 
good to have an explanation for such a shift in policy that went beyond the 
specifics of the change in personnel. 
A benign view of  the switch has been offered by  Cohen (1988, 218): the 
political system worked in the way it should, as the administration eventually 
responded to Congress and the grievances of  groups adversely affected, by 
adopting policies to bring down the dollar. A less benign view would ask, first, 
whether the administration should not have recognized the dollar as a problem 
much sooner and, second, whether even the Plaza switch was indeed an ade- 
quate way to address the trade deficit, given the lack of simultaneous progress 
on the budget deficit and national saving. 
It has been suggested by others that there is a regular cycle within the term 
of  a given political leader, for many countries, but especially large countries 
like the United States for which international trade historically makes up a 
relatively small proportion of  GNP. In his initial vision for the country, the 
leader ignores concerns of international trade, finance, and exchange rates. In 
part this is because he has usually won his office by courting exclusively do- 
mestic constituencies. In part it is because he is not fully aware of economic 
relations such as that between excessive spending and trade deficits or such as 
constraints placed on his country by  the need to maintain the confidence of 
international financial markets. Later in his term, problems develop, and he 
switches to international activism, either because unpleasant international 
deficits demand a response or because the prospect of international economic 
diplomacy offers a pleasant diversion of popular attention from domestic prob- 
lems.  Bergsten (1986) has  argued that,  when  the  Reagan  administration 
switched abruptly from benign neglect of the dollar to activism in 1985, it was 334  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
following a pattern traced by Johnson in the late 1960s, Nixon in 1971, and 
Carter in 1978. 
5.6.2 
Henning (1990) puts forward an interesting hypothesis to explain why the 
constellation of domestic political forces does not prevent large currency over- 
valuations such as that experienced by the dollar in the early 1980s (or by the 
pound in 1980), in contrast to Japan, Germany, and France, where the interests 
of industry are represented with sufficient strength that exchange rate stability 
is a major goal of policy. The explanation essentially consists of two proposi- 
tions. First, in all countries, the banking community enjoys a special access to 
policymakers that industry may not. Second, the financial system in the United 
States (and the United Kingdom) is “capital market based,” meaning that in- 
dustry obtains most of  its external finance by issuing securities, while the fi- 
nancial system in the other three countries is “credit based,” meaning that most 
corporations borrow from one or more large banks with which they are closely 
associated. In Japan, Germany, and France, then, the financial community can 
speak powerfully on behalf of  private-sector interests that are unified in sup- 
porting a competitively valued and stable currency. In the United States and 
the United Kingdom, by  contrast, bankers do not necessarily have the same 
incentives as industry. Furthermore, argues Henning, it is natural that  the 
market-based financial system that exists in the two Anglo-Saxon countries 
creates a constituency for the dollar and pound to be international currencies 
while the private sector in Japan, Germany, and France resists any measures 
that would widen the international use of-and  add to the demand for-their 
currencies. 
Market-Based versus Credit-Based Financial Systems 
5.6.3 
For those who think that the difficulties stemming from the large swings in 
the dollar in the 1980s could have been handled better by policymakers, it is 
natural to ask if there are not some inherent flaws in the structure of the policy- 
making process that could be addressed by institutional reform. 
One view is that the difficulty with the 1981-85  dollar appreciation, indeed, 
the difficulty with the overall macroeconomic policy mix of the decade, was 
lack of coordination between the United States and its trading partners. In this 
view, the U.S. government deliberately chose a policy mix that would give high 
real interest rates and a strong dollar, in order to reduce import prices, thereby 
“exporting inflation” to its neighbors. In technical terms, the noncooperative 
equilibrium is characterized by competitive appreciation, each country afraid 
to lower real interest rates on its own because of the inflationary  consequences 
of currency depreciation. If this diagnosis is correct, the solution would simply 
be to strengthen the G-7 coordination process and use it to agree to simultane- 
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ous reductions in real interest rates (Sachs 1985).57  The difficulty with this 
theory as an interpretation of the 1980s is that (1) only the United States, not 
its major trading partners, adopted a policy mix featuring fiscal expansion and 
(2), if currency appreciation is such an advantageous means of reducing infla- 
tion, then the U.S. policy of the early 1980s was optimal (from a selfish view- 
point), which would tend to undercut the case for reform. 
A second view is that the difficulty with the 1981-85  dollar appreciation, 
and the overall U.S. macroeconomic policy mix, was lack of coordination be- 
tween the Treasury and the Fed. The Fed refused to expand the money supply 
in the absence of a commitment on the part of the administration  to raise taxes 
and cut the budget deficit because it would be inflationary.  The administration 
(together with Congress) refused to raise taxes and cut the budget deficit in the 
absence of a commitment on the part of the Fed to allow interest rates to fall 
sufficiently because it would be recessionary. In this view, the high real interest 
rates and high dollar occurred simply because the two sides never could get 
together on the policy mix. 
The relevance of this view to actual events is doubtful. It is true that Fed 
officials tended to be included in interagency meetings on international eco- 
nomic topics less often in the Reagan administration  than in previous adminis- 
trations. Paul Volcker and Don Regan, in particular, were often at odds in the 
press. Nevertheless, communication  was regular, and there is no evidence that, 
but for the right institutional arrangement to promote cooperation, a deal could 
have been struck. Rather, disagreements stemmed either from differing priorit- 
ies (the Fed more concerned about inflation, the Treasury about growth) or 
from differing perceptions as to the right 
The leading recent proposal for systematic reform of the U.S. institutional 
structure of  exchange rate policy-making is that  of  Destler and  Henning 
(1989). They argue that exchange rate policy is made by a very small circle of 
senior government officials in the Treasury and the Fed, is dangerously di- 
vorced from fiscal and monetary policy, and is frequently unresponsive to the 
legitimate concerns of private economic actors. They recommend a broadening 
of the process, particularly through three important changes: (1) the creation 
in both the House and the Senate of new select oversight committees on the 
dollar and the national economy; (2) the establishment of a new private-sector 
advisory group on exchange rates to counsel the secretary of the Treasury; and 
57. Another version of the view that the problem is a lack of international coordination involves 
beggar-thy-neighbor “competitive depreciation,”  just the reverse of competitive appreciation. Here 
the problem with the Nash noncooperative equilibrium is that each country is tempted to follow 
an overly expansionary monetary policy in order to depreciate its currency and improve its trade 
balance, thereby exporting unemployment to its trading partners. One could view the Louvre Ac- 
cord as an attempt by  U.S. hading partners to address this problem. 
58. If the monetary authority believes that an  increase in government spending would appreciate 
the dollar while the fiscal authority believes that it would not, the two agencies may seek to cooper- 
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(3) more active involvement of agencies such as the CEA, the office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative (USTR), and the Agriculture and Commerce Depart- 
ments (Destler and Henning 1989, 145-64).59 
The view of this author is that, during the period July 1984-February  1985, 
the dollar had appreciated so far that some action such as foreign exchange 
intervention to try to bring it down was indeed warranted, even taking the bud- 
get deficit as given. Since all the groups that Destler and Henning would like 
to bring in to the policy-making process were more worried about the dollar 
and the trade deficit at this time than the Regan Treasury, it follows that ex- 
change rate policy during this eight-month period might have been better had 
their proposed institutional reforms already been in place. Under most other 
circumstances, however, a broadening of the policy process in this way, in the 
sensitive and relatively technical area of  exchange rates, could make things 
worse rather than better. 
Exchange rate policy, like monetary and fiscal policy, is potentially vulner- 
able to populist pressures. Policymakers in  the public eye-lacking  fore- 
bearance and sometimes lacking awareness-might  succumb to the temptation 
to tinker with international financial gimmickry so as to seem to be addressing 
the exchange rate issue, in place of making hard macroeconomic policy deci- 
sions. Sometimes they will refuse to devalue a currency that needs to be deval- 
ued, out of a stubborn unwillingness to admit publicly that their past policies 
have failed. Other times they will seek to devalue a currency that should not 
be, in order to gain the short-term advantage  of higher output and employment, 
figuring that the costs in terms of higher inflation will not show up until after 
the next election. For such reasons, I am skeptical of proposals to democratize 
the policy-making process for exchange rates and would, if anything, prefer to 
see more power concentrated with the Federal Reserve. The Fed tends to have 
more of the historical memory, technical expertise, and insulation from politics 
that are so lacking elsewhere. 
5.6.4  The Bandwagon as Paradigm 
I would like to propose a common paradigm to fit the markets, the media, 
and the makers of policy. The paradigm is the bandwagon, by which I mean 
that the typical resident of each of the three worlds bases his or her actions 
more on what seems to be “in” at the moment than on what makes the most 
sense viewed in a longer-term perspective. 
Consider first the markets. In theory, speculators should base their actions 
on an evaluation of the true worth of the currency as determined by  macro- 
economic fundamentals. In practice, by  1985, only five of twenty-four foreign 
exchange forecasting services were relying on fundamentals. (Fifteen relied on 
59. One of  their (quite valid) purposes in making the proposals was to make the exchange rate 
a deliberate policy instrument consistent with macroeconomic policy, rather than treating it as 
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technical analysis, three used both, and one did not specify.) This is as com- 
pared to 1978, when nineteen of twenty-three services surveyed relied on fun- 
damentals (three on technical analysis). This lack of  attention to long-term 
fundamentals and increasing reliance on time-series extrapolations may  ex- 
plain the apparent speculative  bubble of  1984-85.60 
A speculative  bubble would seem to offer some scope for useful intervention 
by  policy-makers. It is for this reason that the Plaza and other 1985 policy 
moves to try to bring down the dollar could be viewed as a success. But, to 
favor government intervention as a regular matter of course, one would have 
to believe that the policy-making process is systematically  less liable to band- 
wagons than the markets, and this may not be the case. 
Historical memory in both the Treasury and the Congress is notoriously 
short. Official views do not evolve gradually over time as more information 
becomes available. Rather, views change sharply with the personnel, who turn 
over every few years, and with their economic philosophy or perception of 
political advantage. The noninterventionist dogmatism of  Beryl Sprinkel has 
come in for much criticism; the political pragmatism of a Jim Baker will usu- 
ally win out in a popularity contest among journalists or congressmen, and in 
1985 it happened to give what may have been the right answer as economic 
policy as well. But pragmatism can often give the wrong answer. Trade policy 
is an example where the stubbornness of the Treasury and the White House in 
the 1980s was fortunate and where greater accommodation to the Congress or 
outside interests would have given a less satisfactory outcome, from an eco- 
nomic viewpoint. 
It may  sound undemocratic to reserve exchange rate policy-making for a 
small elite like the Federal Reserve Board. But democracy does not mean put- 
ting every issue up for a vote every day. Our system places some policymakers 
under the relatively frequent and direct control of the electorate, such as the 
two-year-termed House of Representatives, and others farther removed, such 
as the members of the Supreme Count. The question is whether exchange rate 
policy is a more fitting topic for the former approach or the latter. Exchange 
rate policy would seem to be the sort of topic that is best reserved for special- 
ists removed from political pressures. 
Although the media were not considered above as a separate interest group 
or policymaker, they are in fact the ultimate arbiter of policy (until the histori- 
ans get their turn). Most critics of the tremendous power of the media phrase 
their criticism in terms of the particular bias that they think the media has. But 
the real problem with the media is that, in its efforts to escape charges of bias, 
it does not undertake enough analysis. Journalists cover the stories that other 
60. One could explain the continued appreciation of the dollar simply by international investors 
putting less weight on the fundamentalist forecasts of dollar depreciation and consequently be- 
coming increasingly attracted to  the  high rates of return offered on dollar assets (Frankel and 
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journalists are covering (so-called pack journalism). The goal is to describe 
current trends rather than to give opinions. The arbiters of policy can end up 
being arbitrary in their evaluations. 
Success in Washington is often judged in a rather superficial way. The sys- 
tem in the aggregate works a bit like trial by fire or water in medieval times. A 
policy operation is a success if it is a political success, it is a political success 
if it is a media success, and it is a media success if it is a success in the public 
opinion polls. The opinion polls often resemble coin tosses because the respon- 
dents are not well acquainted with the issues that the questions concern. 
It is of course true that the dollar began to depreciate in 1985, as desired. 
But the policymakers may just have been lucky. The initiatives taken by Jim 
Baker at the Plaza and other G-7 meetings were, at the time, so tentative that 
he could, and would, have disavowed that there had been any change in policy 
had they not been received well. These initiatives were received well, in large 
part because Baker’s style was such a welcome relief (especially to the press) 
after Don Regan. Regardless of whether one believes that the dollar would have 
come down in 1985-87  even without the initiatives, it is certain that favorable 
reviews, such as those in newspaper editorials and congressional testimony, 
made them a political success. 
The enhanced stature of Baker and the G-7 in turn meant that their pro- 
nouncements carried more weight with the markets. In 1986 and 1987, foreign 
exchange traders would leap for their terminals every time a report came out 
that Baker had said something. After 1985, G-7 meetings replaced trade bal- 
ance announcements  (or, in the early 1980s, money supply announcements)  as 
the current fad variable that the markets followed. 
By 1984, the market bandwagon had carried the dollar far away from a sen- 
sible equilibrium. In 1985, the interdependent bandwagons ridden by the me- 
dia and the makers of policy carried the dollar back. Next time, the medid 
policymaker bandwagons could as easily be the ones to carry the dollar away 
from equilibrium. 
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2.  C. Fred Bergsten 
The Issue 
Exchange rate policy has two dimensions for the United States: national 
management of the dollar and, to a large extent, determination of the interna- 
tional monetary regime.’ The United States reversed or sharply modified its 
policy in both respects on three separate occasions during the 1980s. Hence, 
whatever one thinks of  its substantive importance, the issue area is of unusual 
interest in an assessment of economic policy in the past decade. 
As the 1980s began, the Carter administration and the Volcker Fed were 
successfully attempting to strengthen the dollar (from its free-fall of late 1978) 
in part through managedfloating. From the outset of  1981, the new Reagan 
administration reversed that policy: it studiously ignored the dollar (“benign 
Copyright 0 1991. Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C. All rights reserved. 
1. Destler and Henning (1989, 10-11) usefully define, and distinguish between, direct and indi- 
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neglect”) and aggressively espoused pure floating  (Reagan I). In September 
1985, the administration  reversed its own policy and sought to drive down the 
dollar through, among other things, renewed manugedjoating (Reagan 11). In 
early 1987, the third shift targeted dollar stability and installed a new system 
of reference ranges (Reagan 111). 
Jeffrey Frankel’s  superb background paper accurately and  cogently de- 
scribes these changes and their economic impact. As requested by our chair- 
man, I will focus on the decisions that were made at each key turning point, 
the alternatives that might have been considered at the time, and the conse- 
quences for the economy of the paths that were taken and-obviously  more 
speculatively-those  that were rejected. 
Reagan I (or Regan-Sprinkel) 
Despite all the well-advertised shortcomings of economic policy in the Car- 
ter administration, the Reagan administration  inherited a healthy international 
economic position. The current account was in balance for the third straight 
year despite the second oil shock. The United States was the world’s largest 
creditor country. The exchange rate of the dollar was virtually at fundamental 
equilibrium (in terms of trade competitiveness).2  Trade liberalization had re- 
sumed with the successful conclusion of the Tokyo Round of the GATT. 
The new  administration regarded all these variables as irrelevant. It came 
into office with a series of extremely strong (and, as events revealed, internally 
inconsistent) views on how  the domestic economy should be managed. No 
thought was given to the external consequences of its new policies or to how 
those external effects might in turn feed back on the domestic economy. The 
best evidence of this total neglect was the administration’s initial projection of 
the current account balance for 1983: it got the level just about right, at $70 
billion, but had the sign wrong.3 
Hence, the exchange rate (and the entire external position) was viewed as a 
residual rather than as a policy instrument or even as an intermediate variable. 
An  ideological aversion to governmental interference in  markets reinforced 
this outcome, as did the view-widely  shared internationally  at the time-that 
sterilized intervention in the exchange markets had no lasting impact any~ay.~ 
Total laissez-faire  prevailed for over four years. Indeed, by extolling the virtues 
of a strong dollar, the stance of Reagan I toward the exchange rate added to the 
overvaluation and resulting trade deficits that were fundamentally generated 
by the mix of very loose fiscal policy and very tight monetary policy. 
From my point of view as one of the few early and vocal critics of Reagan 
I (see Bergsten 1981a, 1981b), the enormous irony is that the policy worked 
2. As calculated three years later by  Williamson (1983, fig. A-7). 
3. As reported to the author by  David Stockman, director of  the Office of  Management and 
4.  That view has subsequently  been effectively challenged by  Dominguez and Frankel (1991). 
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for an extended period. The “riverboat gamble” of Reaganomics was that its 
huge budget deficits would not sustain (or even accelerate) the high rates of 
inflation that it inherited or, given a resolute inflation-fighting Federal Reserve, 
push interest rates sky high and crowd out so much domestic investment that 
growth would be impossible. But foreign capital inflows and the soaring dollar 
helped cut inflation and held real interest rates down by as much as 5 percent- 
age points (crowding out the tradables sector instead) (see Marris 1987, 44). 
Benign neglect of the dollar contributed to the “victory” over inflation, permit- 
ted recovery from the recession of 1982, and facilitated the expansion of the 
1980~.~ 
The ulfemafive  to benign neglect in  1981 was continuation of  the dollar 
policy of  the late 1970s-an  effort to maintain the currency at a level that 
would achieve rough balance in the current account, mainly via coordinated 
intervention in  the  exchange  markets  (with  accompanying  rhetoric)  and 
through pushing the surplus countries to grow faster (the “locomotive ap- 
proach”). The cardinal question is the impact that that strategy would have had 
on the domestic economy: would it have “forced” the Fed to ease money to 
hold the dollar down, weakening the battle against inflation (although easing 
the recession of  1982), or would it have “forced” a tightening of fiscal policy 
and thus lessened the problems that plague us to this day? 
Such an “alternative” policy could have made some difference on the exter- 
nal variables. The dollar would have risen a bit less had the United States and 
the G-5 sold dollars (as in 1980) and the administration  displayed less enthusi- 
asm for its climb; in particular, the last 20 percent or so of the dollar’s climb 
in late 1984/early 1985, which then and now  defies any logical explanation 
except as a speculative bubble, might well have been prevented by official in- 
tervention and jawboning. Less diplomatic crockery would have been broken 
had the United States maintained a willingness to cooperate meaningfully and 
benign neglect been less aggressive. Less protectionist pressure would have 
been stimulated in the Congress had the administrative at least tried “to defend 
American trade interests.” 
But the dollar and the trade deficit would still have soared and become 
Feldstein’s “safety valve” for the economy.6  I suspect that the Fed would have 
5. Reagan I also “worked in the sense that its extreme antipathy to any action on the dollar 
enhanced the drama, and thus probably the market impact, of the shift to Reagan II at the Plaza, 
as described below. However, the policy also contributed in important ways to the adoption by the 
administration, as Secretary Baker later admitted (in remarks to the Institute for International 
Economics on 14 September 1987), that “no administration . . . has granted more import relief to 
US.  industiy than any of its predecessors in more than half a century” The macro/monetary/dollar 
policy of  Reagan I made it impossible for that administration to achieve its own objective of 
maintaining open markets at home and promoting liberalization abroad, as indicated in Paula 
Stem’s contribution to this volume. 
6. I subdivide the period Reagan I into Feldstein I and Feldstein II: the chairman of the Council 
of  Economic Advisers touted the virtues of  the strong dollar and the trade deficit as a “safety 
valve” in the former but switched in the latter to citing their costs as a key reason to deal seriously 
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hung tough against inflation. It is hard to imagine much effect on fiscal policy. 
Hence, the major impact of  the alternative policy would have been, as in 
1977-78  and  1986-87,  on America’s economic relations with its key allies. 
Unable and unwilling to change course at home, but concerned in this alterna- 
tive  scenario about incipient dollar overvaluation and trade deficits and the 
resulting protectionist pressures, such an administration would have  strongly 
opposed the tightening of fiscal policy in Japan and Germany that contributed 
in important ways to the buildup of their surpluses (and our deficit). Both might 
have budged a bit, Germany because it was fighting “Eurosclerosis,” and Japan 
to limit renewed “trade conflict.” But any results would probably have been 
quite marginal here too: only slightly faster growth (and perhaps inflation) 
abroad, a slightly smaller buildup in the American trade deficit with a little 
less recession in 1982 and a smaller decline in the inflation rate. 
The only effective alternative to Reagan I would have been for the foreigners 
to take draconian measures to restrict their capital outflows in an effort to force 
a reversal of America’s policy mix, as proposed by a few European and Ameri- 
can economists at the time. Given the openness of international capital flows 
and the markets’ zeal for Reaganomics during this period, however, it would 
have been extremely difficult to implement such a policy. Moreover, the other 
countries would have choked off their own export booms (although, with less 
inflation from currency depreciation, it would then have been easier for them to 
stimulate domestic demand). They would have frontally attacked an American 
administration that was riding high and done so during a period of considerable 
East-West tension. The bottom line is that, although an active exchange rate 
policy might have modestly limited the costs of Reagan I, it was probably an 
inevitable casualty of the policy mix adopted during that period. 
Reagan I1 (or Baker-Darman I) 
The two unsustainabilities of Reagan I exchange rate policy, although slow 
to arrive, did occur as predicted. The internal unsustainability hit most clearly: 
incensed by record trade deficits and the administration’s  total neglect thereof, 
and goaded by a tradables sector, which finally found its political tongue after 
the election of 1984, the Congress threatened to pass highly protectionist trade 
legislation.’ Fear of  the external unsustainability, that is, a “hard landing” of 
the dollar and the economy, suddenly seemed real as well if the current account 
deficit continued to soar because the dollar bubble had burst in early 1985 and 
considerable depreciation had already occurred.8 
7. Congressman Bill Frenzel commented to me at the time that “the Smoot Hawley tariff itself 
would have passed overwhelmingly had it come to the House floor in the fall of 1985.” 
8. The publication of Marris (1987) may have had a significant effect on thinking about this 
aspect of the problem. Manis’s goal was of course to write a self-denying prophecy, which so far 
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Hence, Baker-Darman reversed Regan-Sprinkel. They won G-5 agreement 
both to drive the dollar down and to resume coordinated intervention in the 
currency markets (a la 1978-80)  to do  SO.^ There was little disagreement with 
the new policy either at home or abroad, although questions soon arose about 
how far and how fast the realignment should occur, 
Two alternatives might have been chosen: earlier adoption of the Plaza strat- 
egy and greater reliance on domestic policies (especially in the United States) 
to achieve the desired current account adjustments. The timing, however, was 
dictated by American politics: only after the election of 1984 did Regan and 
Sprinkel leave the Treasury, and only then did the domestic tradables sector 
muster the political courage to attack the administration’s  dollar policy and take 
its case to the Congress.’O Given Reagan I, it would have been difficult to move 
to Reagan I1 much sooner (although the G-5 ministerial in January 1985 started 
the process of driving the dollar down, with much less publicity than the Plaza 
and much less active U.S. participation). 
A more meaningful alternative would have been serious cooperation on “the 
fundamentals” as well as on exchange rates-which  turned out to bear most 
of the burden of pursuing smaller current account imbalances. The monumen- 
tal failure of Baker-Darman was their unwillingness or inability to use the ex- 
ternal threat to convince the president to launch a serious effort to correct the 
problem at its source: the budget deficit. At just about the same time, Congress 
was launching the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings initiative, and the Senate Repub- 
lican leadership developed a major budget package. But the president backed 
away, leaving the flip-flop on dollar policy-plus  renewed exhortations to the 
Japanese and the Germans (a la 1977-78)  to grow faster-to  achieve the ad- 
justment and avert new protectionism. 
A subaltemative would have been for the Federal Reserve to let the dollar 
fall much faster during this period in an effort to force the administration to 
make such a change in fiscal policy. The Fed had considerable leeway to pursue 
such a strategy throughout 1986 because of the sharp fall in oil prices and the 
virtual absence of inflation pressure and some incentive to do so because lower 
dollar interest rates would have further eased Third World debt and strength- 
ened American banks. However, Chairman Volcker chose instead to talk down 
the efforts to talk down the dollar and to resist any declines in U.S. interest 
rates-paradoxically  reducing fears of  the “hard landing” and thus limiting 
pressure on the administration to get serious on the fiscal front.” 
Nevertheless, Reagan  I1 also worked to a considerable extent. Congress 
eventually passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of  1988, but it 
9. The full story is in Funabashi (1988). 
10. The full story is in Destler and Henning (1989). 
11. On that front, “benign neglect” arose again despite the Plaza strategy: 1986 was the year of 
tax reform rather than fiscal contraction. And one (unexpected  and unintended) result of tax reform 
was a sharp decline in the budget deficit in fiscal year 1987, permitting the illusion of progress on 
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was shorn of most of the blatantly protectionist proposals of 1985-86-due  in 
important ways to the Plaza strategy and the clear improvement in American 
competitiveness from the lower dollar. On the financial side, the sharp dollar 
depreciation of  1985-86  was accompanied by continued large inflows of for- 
eign capital despite lower U.S. interest rates-achieving  considerable adjust- 
ment without the “hard landing.” But this problem finally erupted and triggered 
the shift to Reagan 111. 
Reagan I11 (or Baker-Darman 11) 
The “hard landing” seemed to be at hand in 1987. The dollar plunged at the 
start of the year, while interest rates rose. Private capital inflows dried up, and 
foreign central banks had to finance the bulk of America’s massive external 
deficit ($163 billion, 3.5 percent of GNP) throughout the year. The bond mar- 
ket dropped sharply in the spring. Black Monday hit in October, 
Hence, the administration again reversed course on the dollar. Building on 
a yen-dollar stabilization agreement reached at the behest of the Japanese in 
September-October  1986, the G-5/G-7 adopted the Louvre Accord in Febru- 
ary 1987 to try to stop the fall of  the dollar and stabilize currencies within 
unannounced reference ranges (of ?5 percent). They maintained the stabiliza- 
tion effort throughout the year, rebasing the yen-dollar range downward in 
April 1987 and engineering the “Telephone Accord” in December that finally 
succeeded in stabilizing the dollar in early 1988. 
The shift to stabilization at the Louvre was the closest call of  the three 
Reagan shifts on the dollar. The move was understandable because there was 
a serious risk of a “hard landing.” From the Treasury’s standpoint, the Fed’s 
unwillingness to try to counter the rise of  interest rates triggered early in the 
year by  the plunging dollar raised the prospect of heavy domestic costs if  it 
continued the Plaza depreciation strategy. Hence, Baker-Darman decided to 
try to negotiate an alternative adjustment strategy with the G-7 that included 
throwing in the exchange rate towel. 
However, there were at least two alternatives in 1987. The trade deficit was 
still rising (in nominal terms) at the time of  the Louvre Accord and did not 
peak until the third quarter of that year. Hence, in terms of the agreed adjust- 
ment strategy and the continuing threat of both unsustainabilities, it was argu- 
ably quite premature to halt the depreciation. Indeed, stabilization around the 
Louvre level left the dollar overvalued and invited further trouble later-as 
occurred in the fall and played a major role in triggering Black Monday. 
It must be recalled that the administration itself triggered the renewed dollar 
slide in early 1987, and letting it go further was a real alternative-which  could 
have been chosen either by the United States or, via an unwillingness to support 
the dollar in an effort to (again) prompt American budget correction, by  the 
foreign monetary authorities. Given the shift in market sentiments against the 
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via further dollar depreciation or “forced’ fiscal action could have brought still 
higher interest rates and considerable financial disruption. It would have taken 
enormous nerve to let the dollar continue falling. 
The better option was for the administration and the G-7 to do the Louvre 
but to realize that those rates could not hold for long. Hence, they should have 
quietly worked out a second “rebasing” to depreciate the dollar quickly and 
cooperatively by  another 10 percent or so during the summer vacation period 
in August. The G-7 could thus have led the markets to a sustainable level rather 
than fighting additional dollar decline once past the crisis atmosphere of the 
spring.’* 
I believe that this course would have avoided Black Monday. It would have 
obviated the need to drive the dollar back up in the aftermath thereof. It would 
thus have promoted more trade adjustment and less protectionism. It would 
have enhanced the credibility of both the administration and the G-5/G-7. My 
impression is that such a strategy was rejected because of a politically inspired 
focus on trying to maintain stability until November 1988 and an erroneous 
belief that the “Louvre levels” would hold until then. 
This was the one major episode of the 1980s where, given the basic course 
of fiscal and monetary policy, exchange rate policy erred and triggered events 
that could have levied significant costs on the American economy.13 The basic 
lesson of the decade in this area, however, is that dollar policy under current 
institutional arrangements-in  both senses cited at the outset-is  largely de- 
termined by the macroeconomic  policy context (both at home and abroad). As 
noted, different exchange rate policies-particularly  regarding intervention 
and rhetoric-could  have limited the damage to a moderate degree on several 
occasions, especially during Reagan I and again in 1988-89,  when the United 
States and the G-7 failed to resist a renewed rise in the dollar that further 
delayed the needed adjustment. The only alternatives that would have had ma- 
jor effects at the critical decision points, however, would have been Machiavel- 
lian strategies to deliberately worsen the situation in the short run in an effort 
to force the political process to take actions that were needed in the long run- 
a risky course that few governments would want to pursue and that no policy 
regime should require to produce sustainable results. 
I believe that we need a systemic change under which a regime is installed 
that is sufficiently oriented toward the exchange rate, such as target zones, for 
macroeconomic policy to be affected by the external outlook on an ongoing 
basis.14 The European Community has done this with its European Monetary 
12. Williamson’s (1992) latest estimates conclude that the dollar was still overvalued by about 
10 percent at the Louvre level. 
13. The stock market would probably have corrected from its sharp runup earlier in 1987 in any 
event, and Black Monday turned out to have modestly positive effects on the economy by produc- 
ing lower interest rates and some action on the budget deficit. Nevertheless, the outcome could 
have been much less benign, and policy should obviously seek to avoid triggering such huge mar- 
ket disruptions. 
14. My preferred model is in Williamson and Miller (1987). 348  C. Fred Bergsten 
System, as demonstrated most dramatically in the case of France in 1983. If 
such a global system had been in place for some time before 1981, operating 
effectively and credibly, might it have tilted the United States away from adopt- 
ing at least the extreme version of Reaganomics? If so, we could have  still 
experienced economic success in the 1980s with fewer adverse legacies for the 
1990s and beyond. 
Moreover, the absence of  systemic arrangements-along  with the relative 
lack of attention paid to the exchange rate in the United States-virtually  guar- 
antees that policy  in this  area will continue to flip-flop as it did the 1980s. 
Indeed, similar reversals can be observed in the Nixon administration (from its 
original “benign neglect” to Treasury Secretary Connally  ’s  aggressive pursuit 
of devaluation in 1971) and the Carter administration  (from seeking a lower 
dollar in 1977-78 to seeking a stable or stronger dollar in 1979-80)  (see Berg- 
sten 1986). The United States needs to pursue a new exchange rate approach, 
both domestically and internationally, to stabilize and strengthen the utility of 
this policy instrument. 
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3. Michael Mussa 
The  1980s witnessed extraordinarily large swings in  the foreign exchange 
value of the dollar and in the U.S. current account. During President Reagan’s 
first term, these international macroeconomic developments exerted little in- 
fluence on U.S. economic policy. After 1984, however, in the face of large and 
expanding international imbalances and growing protectionist sentiment, and 
with a shift in the team of key administration officials, U.S. economic policy 
moved to a more active and visible concern with management of the exchange 
rate and the balance of payments. In discussing these critical international mac- 
roeconomic developments, and in assessing the policy responses to them, three 
main points deserve particular emphasis. 
First, much of the movement in the foreign exchange value of the dollar and 
in the U.S. current account was an understandable response to other important 
macroeconomic developments, including especially the monetary and fiscal 
policies of the U.S. government. 
Second, in the circumstances of  the 1980s, much of  the movement in the 
dollar in the U.S. current account was desirable from the perspective of  the 
macroeconomic performance of the United States and other countries. This is 
a reasonable judgment despite the many significant problems attributable to, 
or manifest in, the movements of the dollar and in the U.S. current account. 
Third, for the United States, operating in a system of  market-determined 
exchange rates, there is some useful role for “exchange rate policy” that is 
separate from monetary and fiscal policy. Moreover, influencing the exchange 
rate or the current account is occasionally a significant concern of general mac- 
roeconomic policy. However, the independent influence of exchange rate pol- 
icy is quite limited, and key domestic economic objectives usually dominate 
the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy. 
These issues are discussed or alluded to in Jeffrey Frankel’s excellent paper 
and are considered in Fred Bergsten’s thoughtful remarks. Somewhat surpris- 
ingly, I find myself in close agreement with most of Fred’s comments, and I 
have  only modest differences with Jeff‘s  discussion and analysis. These re- 
marks will focus primarily on those issues where we have some disagreement 
or meaningful difference of emphasis or interpretation. 
Causes of Exchange Rate Adjustments and Payments Imbalances 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in early 1973, market forces 
have played the dominant role in determining the foreign exchange value of 
the dollar. These market forces, however, are sensitive to perceptions concern- 
ing the actual and expected future conduct of economic policies. After all, if 
economic policies kept exchange rates pegged for long periods under the Bret- 350  Michael Mussa 
ton Woods system, it stands to reason that these policies ought to be important 
determinants of exchange rate behavior under a floating rate system. The in- 
fluence of these policies, especially U.S. monetary policy, is apparent in the 
major movements of the foreign exchange value of the dollar during the 1980s. 
Major movements in the U.S. current account, in turn, can be explained to a 
significant extent (with a lag) by movements in the value of the dollar. 
The Important Role of Monetary Policy 
In the late 1970s, the real foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar fell to 
the lowest level in the postwar era. In my  view, the apparent incapacity of 
U.S. economic policy, especially monetary policy, to restrain and reverse the 
persistent rise of the US.  inflation rate was the key reason for this dollar depre- 
ciation. Nominal depreciation was required to match the excess of U.S. infla- 
tion over that of other countries, and real depreciation  reflected the “overshoot- 
ing” response to progressively greater disappointment about the inability to 
contain the rise of inflationary pressures. 
After an abortive effort to combat inflation through monetary tightening dur- 
ing late 1979 and early 1980, the Federal Reserve embarked on a determined 
and ultimately successful effort beginning in late 1980. For twenty months, 
despite a deepening recession, a tight monetary policy was maintained until 
the summer of  1982. The inflation rate was brought down from 13 percent 
during 1980 to 4 percent during 1982, where it remained for most of the rest 
of the decade. Unquestionably, this successful effort to control inflation dra- 
matically altered expectations concerning both the likely future course of in- 
flation and the willingness of  the U.S.  policy authorities to undertake deter- 
mined and costly actions to combat rising inflation. 
In a world where national price levels adjust relatively slowly in comparison 
with exchange rates and other asset prices, the modem theory of exchange rate 
determination predicts the response of the exchange rate to such a change in 
expectations. There should have been a strong real appreciation of the dollar 
as the “overshooting” response to the dramatic shift from growing fears of 
policies that tolerated a persistently rising inflation rate to a growing convic- 
tion that policies would deliver a much more moderate inflation rate. This re- 
sponse should not have occurred all at once, with the initial tightening of mon- 
etary policy, but only gradually, as people became increasingly persuaded that 
the reduction in inflation would prove enduring. 
Indeed, it is entirely possible that real appreciation of the dollar in response 
to changing expectations of the longer-term inflation rate continued well after 
the Federal Reserve’s shift to an easier monetary policy in the late summer of 
1982. As the economic activity recovered vigorously during 1983,  the inflation 
rate nevertheless remained slightly below 4 percent. This development pro- 
vided reassurance that there would not be a rapid rebound of inflation with the 
onset of economic recovery, as had occurred after the abortive attack on infla- 
tion during 1980. Moreover, when some indication of rising inflationary pres- 351  Exchange Rate Policy 
sures appeared in early 1984, the Federal Reserve retightened monetary policy 
during the spring and summer. This important action, taken in a presidential 
election year and at some risk to the continuation of the recovery, demonstrated 
the durability of the Federal Reserve’s resolve to resist increases in inflation. 
Thus, in explaining the enormous upswing in the foreign exchange value of 
the dollar between the summer of  1980 and early 1985, I would assign some- 
what greater importance than Jeffrey Frankel does to the shift in the perceived 
stance of U.S. monetary policy. There remains, however, an important part of 
the upswing of the dollar that is difficult to attribute to monetary policy or to 
any other identifiable change in economic fundamentals. This is especially 
so for the last 10 or 15 percent of dollar appreciation in late 1984 and early 
1985. 
While the decline of the dollar during 1985 and 1986 is associated with a 
substantial easing of  U.S.  monetary policy, this factor alone appears inade- 
quate to explain the nearly complete reversal of the dollar’s earlier apprecia- 
tion. The U.S. inflation rate remained about 4 percent during 1985 and, under 
the impact of falling world oil prices, dropped to barely 1 percent during 1986. 
Thus, despite monetary easing, there was no substantial reason to fear that the 
Federal Reserve had again reversed course and would tolerate a substantial 
increase in the longer-term inflation rate. Accordingly, there should not have 
been a strong overshooting effect toward dollar depreciation in response to the 
easing of monetary policy. 
On the other hand, the theory of exchange rate determination does imply a 
gradual unwinding of the overshooting effect of the earlier shift in expectations 
concerning  U.S. monetary policy. Real dollar appreciation  attributable  to rising 
confidence about the anti-inflationary stance of U.S. monetary policy during 
the early 1980s should have been gradually reversed during the mid-1980s. In 
addition, the persistent deterioration of the U.S. trade and current account bal- 
ance during 1985-86  apparently provided information suggesting that a lower 
real exchange rate for the dollar was needed to achieve a sustainable balance 
of  payments position for the United States. Nevertheless, as Jeffrey Frankel 
suggests, when account is taken of all the “fundamental”  factors, there remains 
room for a spontaneous reversal of earlier market enthusiasm, or for exchange 
rate policy, to have played a significant role in bringing down the dollar. 
The firming of U.S. monetary policy from early 1987 until the stock market 
crash on 19 October probably helped forestal! further declines in the dollar, 
especially during the spring, when Japanese and German monetary policy was 
moving toward greater ease. After the crash, the apparent concern of the Fed- 
eral Reserve with combating possible recession contributed to dollar weak- 
ness. Subsequently, from March 1988 through June 1989, U.S. monetary pol- 
icy was progressively and substantially  tightened in response to concerns about 
rising inflation. This monetary tightening was surely an important cause of 
dollar appreciation during this period, despite the wishes of  the G-7 finance 
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The Influence of Fiscal Policy 
In addition to monetary policy, U.S. fiscal policy is also often cited as a key 
determinant of major swings in the foreign exchange value of the dollar. The 
standard analysis, as described by  Jeffrey Frankel, is that the expansionary 
fiscal policy of the first Reagan administration helped push up U.S.  real interest 
rates (relative to foreign real interest rates) and through that mechanism con- 
tributed substantially to the real appreciation of the dollar from 1980 through 
1984. By making U.S. goods relatively more expensive in comparison with 
foreign goods, the real appreciation of  the dollar was, in turn, the proximate 
cause of the massive deterioration of the U.S. current account balance. Sym- 
metrically, the increased demand for capital implied by  the fiscal deficit and 
reflected in high U.S. interest rates induced a massive inflow of foreign capital 
that was the financial counterpart of the current account deficit. 
On these issues, I would argue that the emphasis on the interest rate mecha- 
nism as the channel through which fiscal policy influenced the exchange rate 
and the current account has been somewhat overdone. In the circumstances of 
the early 1980s, the Reagan tax cuts and defense buildup probably did put 
some upward pressure on U.S. interest rates. However, the empirical evidence 
that fiscal policy has consistent and powerful effects on interest rates is not 
compelling. Moreover, there are other channels through which expansionary 
fiscal policy might have affected the real exchange rate and the current account. 
During the first six quarters of  economic recovery, from the end of  1982 
through the middle of  1984, real domestic demand in the U.S. economy rose 
at a phenomenal 9 percent average annual rate. The usual Keynesian effects of 
expansionary fiscal policy are part of the explanation of this growth of domes- 
tic demand. So too are the supply-side, incentive effects of substantial reduc- 
tions in tax rates on business investment and (perhaps) also the favorable incen- 
tives of lower individual taxes on labor effort. In addition, the restoration of 
consumer confidence and the gain in household wealth occasioned by  rising 
stock and bond prices provided a powerful stimulus to consumption spending. 
During the same period, real domestic demand rose very sluggishly in other 
industrial countries and was generally falling in developing countries affected 
by  the debt crisis. On the basis of  a very simple economic theory, without 
complications involving interest rates, the pattern of the growth of domestic 
demand around the world should have had important effects on the real foreign 
exchange value of the dollar. The price of U.S. output, for which demand was 
growing rapidly, should have risen relative to the price of the outputs of nations 
where domestic demand was growing slowly. In addition, as emphasized by 
many “supply-side” economists, the increased attractiveness of  owning U.S. 
capital (partly resulting from the Reagan tax cuts) may have stimulated a flow 
of foreign investment, which tended to appreciate the dollar. Also, concerns 
about economic and military security in  Western Europe during the early 
1980s may have contributed a “safe-haven effect” to dollar appreciation. 353  Exchange Rate Policy 
After the middle of  1984, the rate of growth of real domestic demand slack- 
ened in the United States and began to pick up in other industrial countries. 
From late  1986 through the end of  the decade, the growth of  real domestic 
demand in the United States often fell below that of other industrial countries. 
Again, a simple theory suggests that these developments should have implied 
a weakening in the real foreign exchange value of the dollar. 
For the current account, there is also a simple story. When real domestic 
demand dropped sharply during the recession of  1981-82,  part of that decline 
fell on imports of foreign goods, and the U.S. current account improved. When 
U.S. real domestic demand expanded very rapidly during the initial stages of 
recovery, part of that expansion fell on increased imports of foreign goods, and 
the U.S. current account deteriorated. This deterioration was accentuated both 
by the slow growth of demand in other countries, which retarded the growth 
of  U.S. exports, and by  the real appreciation of the dollar, which shifted a 
larger fraction of world demand growth toward foreign goods and away from 
U.S. goods. In the mid-l980s, deterioration of the US.  current account contin- 
ued because of the lagged effects of the strong dollar. 
In late  1987, for a variety of  reasons, the U.S. current account began to 
improve. Most important, the effects of the huge real dollar depreciation since 
early 1985 started to take hold, stimulating rapid growth of U.S. exports and 
retarding growth of U.S.  imports. At the same time, moderating growth of 
consumer spending and reduction of the U.S. fiscal deficit significantly dimin- 
ished growth of real domestic demand in the United States. In other industrial 
countries, strong gains in real incomes and some stimulative fiscal policy ac- 
tions were simultaneously generating stronger growth of  real demand. The 
combined effect of all these forces was a 60 percent increase in U.S. real ex- 
ports (in the GNP accounts) over the four years beginning with the fourth quar- 
ter of  1986 and a more than one-third reduction of the nominal U.S. current 
account deficit by  1990 from its peak in 1987. 
Of  course, movements in U.S. interest rates were not totally unrelated to 
movements in the dollar, in the U.S. current account, in U.S. monetary policy, 
or in U.S. fiscal policy. The point is that the interest rate mechanism is not the 
only plausible channel through which U.S. fiscal policy might have exerted 
some influence on the evolution of the dollar and the current account. For eco- 
nomic policy, the bottom-line issue is whether large and persistent fiscal defi- 
cits tended to contribute to the large U.S. current account deficit or, equiva- 
lently,  whether  actions  to  reduce  the  fiscal  deficit  might  contribute  to 
reductions in the current account deficit. On this issue, broad agreement was 
ultimately reached within the administration, despite skepticism about the in- 
terest rate effects of fiscal policy. The proviso, of course, was that deficit reduc- 
tion be achieved through economic growth and spending restraint rather than 
through tax increases. 354  Michael Mussa 
Virtues of Exchange Rate Adjustments and Payments Imbalances 
Many discussions of U.S. economic policy lament the wide swings of the 
dollar exchange rate and the deterioration of the U.S. current account as critical 
problems of  the  1980s. Clearly, many individuals and enterprises did suffer 
significant hardships from the intense pressure of foreign competition. Never- 
theless, it is important to recognize that, from a broad macroeconomic perspec- 
tive, much of the movement in the foreign exchange value of the dollar and in 
the U.S. current account during the 1980s was a necessary and often desirable 
concomitant of  generally favorable economic developments. 
Benefits from the Dollar’s Upswing 
At the beginning of the 1980s,  U.S. economic policy fought a necessary and 
successful battle against the evils of persistently rising inflation. After a deep 
recession that was the inevitable consequence of this struggle, the U.S. econ- 
omy enjoyed nearly eight years of relatively vigorous economic expansion dur- 
ing which the annual inflation rate generally remained close to 4 percent. 
Growth of productivity and of real per capita GNP was not as strong as during 
the period of exceptional economic progress in the 1950s and 1960s.  However, 
taking account of the need to combat inflation inherited from the 1970s and of 
the success of that effort, the overall record of U.S.  macroeconomic perfor- 
mance during the 1980s was a significant improvement over recent years. 
Concerning specifically the upswing of  the dollar during the early 1980s, 
there should be no doubt that the successful assault on inflation during 1981- 
82 was a key  reason for substantial real dollar appreciation. Only a failure 
to confront this critical problem effectively would have kept the dollar at the 
depressed level to which it had fallen in the late 1970s. 
As previously discussed, further real appreciation of the dollar during 1983 
and early 1984 was partly due to the same economic forces that generated the 
very strong initial recovery of the U.S. economy from the recession of  1981- 
82, especially as reflected in the phenomenally rapid growth of real domestic 
demand. Moreover, dollar appreciation during this period clearly helped di- 
minish inflationary pressures in the United States, both directly, by  reducing 
import prices, and indirectly, by putting pressure on producers of internation- 
ally tradable goods to control costs and keep their prices from rising. 
Dollar appreciation during 1983 and early 1984 also helped spread the im- 
petus of strong demand growth in the United States to other countries where 
economic recovery would otherwise have been anemic or virtually nonexistent. 
Deterioration of the U.S. current account was the manifestation of this desir- 
able leakage of demand growth from the United States to other countries, espe- 
cially to developing countries that were struggling to improve their own cur- 
rent accounts. 
On  the  other hand, given  the usual lag in  the impact of  exchange rate 
changes on trade flows, the final year of dollar appreciation was probably not 355  Exchange Rate Policy 
reflected in the U.S. current account until 1986. By this time, further deteriora- 
tion of the U.S. current account was not particularly a blessing for the United 
States or the rest of  the world. Nevertheless, dollar appreciation during the 
spring and  summer of  1984 did help restrain inflationary pressures in the 
United States and was partly attributable to a timely action to retighten U.S. 
monetary policy to provide reassurance of the Federal Reserve’s resistance to 
any resurgence of inflation. Thus, only for the last three or four months of 
dollar appreciation, in late 1984 and early 1985, is it possible to find neither a 
plausible economic rationale or a meaningful macroeconomic benefit. 
Avoidance of the Hard Landing 
In the mid- 1980s, many economic commentators expressed concern about 
the dangers of a “hard landing’’-a  sharp drop in the dollar that would frighten 
foreign investors and cut off the flow of  foreign capital essential to finance 
much of U.S. net investment. For the United States, the predicted result was 
both high inflation (due to rising import prices) and deep recession (resulting 
from higher interest rates and the collapse of investment). For other countries, 
the prospect was recession resulting from a sharp decline in U.S. demand for 
their exports. 
In the event, there was no hard banding. Although the dollar did drop precipi- 
tously from early 1985 until early 1987, there was no marked acceleration of 
inflation in the United States, no sharp cutback in the inflow of foreign capital, 
no sudden upsurge in interest rates, and no U.S. recession. Indeed, the stimulus 
to U.S. export growth and to investment by export-oriented  industries contrib- 
uted substantially to economic growth beginning in late 1986 and helped fore- 
stall a possible recession in the aftermath of the stock market crash of October 
1987. In Japan, there was a brief pause in growth as export industries felt the 
impact of a sharply stronger yen, but there was no general economic downturn 
among countries whose currencies appreciated strongly against the dollar. 
Thus, all things considered, not only did the world economy adjust remarkably 
smoothly to the large decline of the dollar in the mid-l980s, but the effects of 
this exchange rate adjustment probably also contributed to a more satisfactory 
macroeconomic performance during the second half of the decade. 
Of course, it cannot reasonably be argued that all of the wide swing in the 
foreign exchange value of the dollar or in the U.S. current account during the 
1980s was necessary and desirable, even leaving aside the bizarre appreciation 
of  late 1984 and early 1985. In the early 1980s, a less tight U.S.  monetary 
policy and a less easy fiscal policy might have avoided some of the enormous 
appreciation of the dollar, without sacrificing much progress in reducing infla- 
tion or in speeding economic recovery. Later in the decade, a more vigorous 
attack on the U.S. fiscal deficit and a more even course of U.S. monetary policy 
(less easing in 1985-86  and less tightening in  1988-89) might have achieved 
superior results for growth and inflation while also smoothing the course for 
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In other leading countries, monetary and fiscal policies supporting some- 
what stronger growth of domestic demand early in the decade might also have 
limited the extent of dollar appreciation and the need for subsequent correc- 
tion, without exacerbating domestic inflation or impairing economic growth. 
Nevertheless, while improvements in  economic policies both  at home and 
abroad might have produced a somewhat smoother course for the dollar, there 
is little doubt that substantial swings in the foreign exchange value of the dollar 
and in the U.S. current account played an essential and desirable role in achiev- 
ing the relatively favorable macroeconomic performance of the 1980s. 
The Limited Role of Exchange Rate Policy 
Monetary policy and fiscal policy are the primary tools through which the 
U.S. government may affect the foreign exchange value of the dollar and the 
current account balance. The issues of exchange rate policy, therefore, are pri- 
marily questions of the degree to which the behavior of the exchange rate or 
the current account should influence monetary and fiscal policy. In addition, 
there is the question of the extent to which the U.S. government can conduct 
an exchange rate policy that is separate from its monetary and fiscal policy. 
The Exchange Rate as a Concern of Monetary Policy 
During the 1980s,  concerns about the exchange rate and the current account 
rarely exerted significant influence on the Federal Reserve’s conduct of  U.S. 
monetary policy. The record of the meetings of the Federal Open Market Com- 
mittee (FOMC) indicates that, except for a few occasions in 1985, 1986, and 
1987, relatively little attention was paid to international economic develop- 
ments in decisions about monetary policy. A detailed analysis of the Federal 
Reserve’s actions reveals that concerns about inflation and about output and 
employment growth were almost always the critical determinants of U.S. mon- 
etary policy. Moreover, as Jeffrey Frankel points out, in the formulation of both 
the Plaza Agreement and the Louvre Accord (the two most important policy 
actions explicitly directed at affecting the value of the dollar), no explicit con- 
sideration was given to monetary policy. 
With regard to the appropriate influence of the exchange rate on U.S. mone- 
tary policy, it would seem peculiar-even  outrageous-to  argue that the Fed- 
eral Reserve should have avoided or aborted its determined effort to combat 
inflation in 198  1-82  because of concern about possibly excessive appreciation 
of the dollar. Similarly, few would argue that the Federal Reserve should have 
risked reigniting rapid inflation by  running a highly expansionary monetary 
policy throughout 1984 in order to induce dollar depreciation. 
Perhaps most revealing is the episode of  monetary tightening from early 
1988 to mid-1989. Initially, this US.  monetary tightening helped firm the dol- 
lar in a manner consistent with the preferences of exchange rate policy, as ex- 
pressed by the G-7 finance ministers. By late 1988, however, it was feared that 357  Exchange Rate Policy 
further dollar appreciation might impede progress in reducing international 
payments imbalances. While finance ministries, including the U.S. Treasury, 
ordered intervention to combat the rise of  the dollar, U.S. monetary policy 
remained targeted to resisting inflation. The dollar continued to appreciate. 
The issue posed by  this episode is whether U.S. monetary policy should 
have given much greater emphasis to the exchange rate in late 1988 and the 
first half of 1989. For those who believe that the inflationary danger was exag- 
gerated and that monetary policy was too tight for purely domestic economic 
purposes, this is not a challenging question. However, granting that the danger 
of rising inflation was real, can it persuasively be argued that monetary policy 
should have ignored this danger in favor of stabilizing the exchange rate? The 
bitter experience of the late 1970s and early 1980s demonstrated the costs of 
allowing inflation to build momentum before taking effective action. Would 
the late 1980s have begun a repeat of this sad experience had the Federal Re- 
serve ignored the inflationary danger and focused more attention on stabilizing 
the dollar? 
International Influences on U.S. Fiscal Policy 
For U.S. fiscal policy, there is no question that concerns about the exchange 
rate or the current account have rarely, if ever, been determining factors. During 
President Reagan’s first term, the administration’s fiscal policy was dominated 
by  the supply-side tax cuts, by  cuts in domestic spending programs, and by 
the defense buildup-all  of  which were key  policy priorities. Strong dollar 
appreciation was not an officially anticipated result of  this fiscal policy but 
was welcomed as a sign of the administration’s overall success. Some officials, 
notably Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) Chairman Martin Feldstein, ex- 
pressed skepticism. However, in the political environment of Ronald Reagan’s 
reelection campaign, there could be no room for doubt about the virtues of a 
strong  dollar,  whatever  its  cause  and  whatever  future difficulties it  might 
portend. 
In President Reagan’s second term, the initial priority for fiscal policy was 
not deficit reduction but tax reform. However, by early 1985, the rising U.S. 
current account deficit and increasing protectionist sentiment did become seri- 
ous concerns of administration policymakers. The response was to seek dollar 
depreciation and stronger growth of  foreign demand for U.S. exports rather 
than to mount a determined assault on the federal deficit. Even under the pres- 
sure of  the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) deficit reduction targets, there 
was little effective action to reduce the federal deficit until late 1986. The presi- 
dent supported domestic spending restraint but would not agree to tax in- 
creases or military spending cuts. The Congress talked about deficit reduction 
and criticized the president’s budget but exhibited little willingness to cut any 
spending programs or propose any specific tax increases. In the political debate 
over the budget, there was vague recognition that the fiscal deficit might be 
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compelling, and concern over the current account was not sufficiently great, to 
stimulate much action to reduce the fiscal deficit. 
In fiscal year 1987, the federal deficit fell to 3 percent of GNP, from 5 per- 
cent in the preceding fiscal year. This accomplishment partly reflected political 
pressures to do something to meet the GRH deficit targets in the congressional 
session that ended just before the 1986 midterm elections. In part, it was the 
accidental consequence of the revenue bulge from the onset of tax reform and 
from the exceptionally and unexpectedly strong performance of the U.S. econ- 
omy. The budget agreement pounded out after the stock market crash achieved 
enough to lock in the accidental gains of fiscal 1987 and hold the budget deficit 
to 3 percent of GNP for the remainder of the decade. 
From the perspective of  international economic policy, the key fact about 
the deficit reduction accomplished during the final three years of the 1980s is 
that it was no more than marginally affected by concerns about the exchange 
rate and the current account. For years, foreign government officials had been 
berating U.S. officials, including President Reagan, about the need to cut the 
U.S. fiscal deficit. When significant deficit reduction was achieved, U.S. offi- 
cials were happy to take credit for their contribution  to “international  economic 
policy coordination” (while foreign officials expressed skepticism about the 
size and permanence of the accomplishment).  Nevertheless, viewing the pro- 
cess as a member of the Council of Economic Advisers, I have no doubt that 
domestic political and economic concerns, rather than efforts at international 
policy coordination, were the driving force behind any accomplishments  in the 
area of fiscal deficit reduction. 
In the future, of course, it is possible that international economic concerns 
may weigh more heavily in the conduct of U.S. fiscal policy. However, long 
experience before, during, and after the 1980s suggests that such concerns will 
rarely exert much influence on U.S. fiscal policy. The powerful interests at play 
in any significant issue of fiscal policy and the division of power and the nature 
of the policy-making process dictate that vague concerns about the exchange 
rate and the current account will be given little weight in politically determined 
outcomes. The notion that U.S. fiscal policy will be actively manipulated to 
affect the exchange rate or the balance of payments is an economist’s dream- 
or nightmare. It is not a practical issue of economic policy. 
Official Intervention and Exchange Rate Policy 
Finally, there is the question of  exchange rate policy that is separate from 
monetary and fiscal policy. Such policy consists of  sterilized official inter- 
vention in foreign exchange markets and public statements (and background 
rumors) of high government officials directed toward altering the behavior of 
exchange rates. In the first Reagan administration,  there was no such policy- 
or, as Jeffrey Frankel describes it, there was Treasury Undersecretary for Mon- 
etary Affairs Beryl Sprinkel’s policy of benign neglect. In the second Reagan 
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Darman, Undersecretary David Mulford, and (later) Nicholas Brady pursued 
more active and publicly visible policy to influence the exchange rate. 
In my view, the early policy of “benign neglect” was 80 or 90 percent cor- 
rect, and the subsequent policy was more of  a political and public relations 
success than a substantive accomplishment.  As previously discussed, much of 
the appreciation of the dollar during the early 1980s was the inevitable and, to 
a substantial extent, desirable consequence of the macroeconomic events and 
policies of  that period. Exchange rate policy that did not alter monetary or 
fiscal policy could not have done much to avoid most of the appreciation of the 
dollar, and it would probably have been a mistake to try. 
The important exception (and one of the few issues on which I have a sig- 
nificant disagreement  with Beryl Sprinkel) is the last 10 or 15 percent of dollar 
appreciation in late 1984 and early 1985. Given the enormous run-up of  the 
dollar by  the summer of  1984, there was no plausible economic rationale for 
further appreciation. In retrospect, and even at the time, it seems clear that 
avoiding the final lunge of appreciation would have been worthwhile. An offi- 
cial statement that too much dollar appreciation was undesirable-backed  by 
substantial, coordinated intervention against the dollar-might  have turned the 
tide. If ever there was an occasion for using exchange rate policy to correct a 
fundamental disequilibrium,  this was such an occasion. Surely, there was little 
harm in trying. 
The occasional usefulness of exchange rate policy was illustrated in Febru- 
ary 1985, when the dollar finally began its long downward correction. At this 
time, there was publicly reported intervention against the dollar by  leading 
central banks, including (for the first time since 1981) the Federal Reserve. In 
the Plaza Agreement of 22 September 1985, the finance ministers of the G-5 
countries publicly declared that “some further orderly appreciation of  non- 
dollar currencies is desirable,” and this declaration was subsequently backed 
by coordinated intervention. 
It is difficult to know how much these efforts at exchange rate policy con- 
tributed to the dollar’s actual decline during 1985. The easing of U.S. monetary 
policy, together with the implications of  large and growing US. current ac- 
count deficits, was surely an important fundamental force for a lower dollar. 
Moreover, as Martin Feldstein and others have emphasized, the dollar headed 
downward throughout most of  1985, even when there were no official an- 
nouncements or intervention  pushing in that direction. On the other hand, there 
were large drops in  the dollar simultaneously with major interventions and 
immediately after the announcement of the Plaza Agreement. On balance, the 
lesson from this experience appears to be that exchange rate policy can enjoy 
success when it is reinforcing rather than resisting the basic trend in the market 
and when it is supported by, or at least consistent with, more fundamental eco- 
nomic forces. 
The limits on the effectiveness of exchange rate policy are powerfully illus- 
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Treasury remained favorably disposed toward further dollar depreciation, the 
Japanese and German governments began to intervene against what they per- 
ceived as excessive appreciation of their currencies. Despite quite a large inter- 
vention, the yen and the deutsche mark continued to appreciate. In the Louvre 
Accord of February 1987, the G-7 finance ministers proclaimed that the dollar 
had depreciated sufficiently and that further depreciation would be resisted. 
Within weeks, market pressures forced an upward rebasing of the implicit tar- 
get range for the yen. Late in 1987, in the aftermath of the stock market crash, 
the dollar began to move sharply downward, despite substantial intervention 
by  foreign central banks, but with the perception that U.S. authorities were 
not unhappy with further dollar depreciation. During 1988-89,  the progressive 
tightening of U.S. monetary policy overwhelmed the internationally coordi- 
nated, publicly announced ef€orts  to resist dollar appreciation through the lim- 
ited tools of exchange rate policy. 
It is not surprising that exchange rate policy, unsupported by  more funda- 
mental forces, often exhibited little influence on the value of the dollar. Even if 
portfolio-balance models of exchange rate determination (referred to by Jeffrey 
Frankel) are correct, it would presumably take hundreds of billions of dollars 
of  sterilized intervention to affect significantly the foreign exchange value of 
the dollar by altering the relative supplies of  assets denominated in different 
national currencies. When more modest official intervention succeeds in in- 
fluencing exchange rates-as  it sometimes does-it  is because intervention 
signals something about official intentions concerning more fundamental poli- 
cies that markets are more prepared to believe rather than to contradict. 
Finally, some of the dangers of  an excessively active exchange rate policy 
should be noted. Large-scale official intervention can become expensive to the 
taxpayer if the authorities consistently fail to outguess the market. In practice, 
however, losses from official intervention are usually not large, except when 
authorities persist in futile attempts to defend an unsustainable exchange rate. 
Perhaps of greater concern is the possibility that excessive and unsuccessful 
use of exchange rate policy will diminish its effectiveness on those few occa- 
sions when it can be helpful. The signaling effect of official intervention ought 
to depend on the quality of the signal, and a record of misguided intervention 
presumably impairs signal quality. Probably of greatest concern is the risk that 
exchange rate policy may pervert the conduct of other, more important policies, 
especially monetary policy. For example, it has been suggested that the recent 
increase of inflation in the United Kingdom has been the consequence of rapid 
money creation resulting from efforts to stabilize the sterling/deutsche mark 
exchange rate during the late 1980s. In the United States, where monetary pol- 
icy is institutionally separated and insulated from exchange rate policy, this 
danger may not be acute. However, in the political environment where govern- 
ment officials occasionally become attached to the success of their pet policies, 
this danger should not be entirely ignored. 361  Exchange Rate Policy 
Summary of Discussion 
Paul  Volcker began the discussion by  stating some of  his views on exchange 
rate policy. First, he expressed his agreement with Mussa on the topic of steri- 
lized intervention-there  is not much cost to it, and it is sometimes helpful as 
a signaling device. So  he thought that sterilized intervention should not be 
abandoned as a policy tool, but he would not expect too much from it. He 
disagreed entirely with the description in Frankel’s paper of the Federal Re- 
serve’s legal authority for exchange market intervention.  Although the Treasury 
Department may  apply pressure on the Fed to intervene in certain ways (or 
more likely not to intervene), the Fed is clearly entitled legally to intervene (or 
not to intervene)  on its own. It boils down to the practical need for coordination 
and the Treasury’s general claim to executive leadership in international eco- 
nomic policy. 
Next, Volcker said that he instinctively likes a strong dollar. He thought that 
the dollar had been too strong during the period 1983-85,  but he gets nervous 
when people are too relaxed about the dollar depreciating. Also, he thought 
that it would have been dangerous and ineffective to try to manipulate the value 
of the dollar by monetary policy, in the absence of the president and Congress 
making the changes that we have seen as necessary in fiscal policy. 
Finally, Volcker said that the United States should be trying to achieve more 
stable exchange rates and that monetary policy would need to play  a role in 
that. 
Martin Feldstein asked whether the policymakers who met at the Louvre 
and the Plaza had distinguished between sterilized and unsterilized interven- 
tion. Volcker responded that people assumed that the intervention would be 
sterilized, although there was no explicit discussion of this point. 
Feldstein then asked why the policymakers had pursued a course of action 
that the Jurgensen Report had declared to be useless. Did the policymakers 
think that sterilized intervention might work in some instances? Did they in- 
tend the policy to be a signal of something and, if so, of what? 
Volcker said that, although the tone of the Jurgensen Report had been ex- 
tremely skeptical, it had  not said that sterilized intervention was ineffective 
under all circumstances. He added that he had indicated to the Treasury De- 
partment prior to the Plaza Agreement that monetary policy was unlikely to be 
tightened soon, which would have defeated the effort to depreciate the dollar. 
Feldstein supposed that the sterilized intervention had thus sent a signal that 
the Fed was not going to tighten monetary policy soon. 
It seemed peculiar to William Poole that many people want to continue to 
use sterilized intervention, even though they seem to agree that it is not very 
effective. He thought that the danger of  retaining sterilized intervention as a 
policy instrument is that it would be used in circumstances  where it is inappro- 
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thought that the economy would have been better off if  the Federal Reserve 
had not had the authority to impose credit controls in 1980, even though there 
are, conceivably, some circumstances  under which such controls might be use- 
ful. Poole doubted that the marginal signaling value of exchange market inter- 
vention was worth the possible misuse of the tool. 
Volcker replied that he thought that exchange rate intervention could be quite 
effective as a signaling device ifit is believed that more fundamental policies 
will be changed if needed to back up that signal. In this case, one might avoid 
the need, for instance, of a change in fiscal or monetary policy that might cut 
across the grain of other objectives as long as markets are confident that the 
government would be willing to do it if  required in  the end to back up the 
stability of  the  currency.  What  is  involved  is  expectations. Nevertheless, 
he agreed with Poole that intervention can be abused, and he said that the 
chairman of  the Federal Reserve Board should take care to use it construc- 
tively. 
Fred  Bergsten  asked whether fundamental macroeconomic policy in the 
United States would have been different at the time of  the Plaza agreement 
had exchange rate intervention been ruled out. Would fiscal policy have been 
tightened, for example? 
Feldstein answered that he thought that macroeconomic policy would not 
have been any different. Volcker agreed, saying that, although Treasury Secre- 
tary James Baker probably acknowledged that there was a connection between 
the budget deficit and the trade deficit, he was unwilling to bear the political 
costs that he thought would be incurred by  proposing any change in  fiscal 
policy. 
Bergsten said that, if Feldstein and Volcker were correct that fiscal policy 
would not have changed under any circumstances, then it was good to use 
exchange rate intervention at least to try to lower the value of the dollar. 
Poole responded that it is not clear that the Plaza Agreement had much 
effect on the value of the dollar anyway. The dollar had depreciated a lot before 
the Plaza Agreement, and, although it continued to decline steadily, its decline 
was actually slowed by  the actions of  foreign central banks. Official capital 
flowed into the United States after the agreement because the Japanese, Ger- 
man, and British central banks were trying, Poole thought, to prevent their own 
currencies from appreciating too rapidly. 
Feldstein agreed, noting that, if one studies the movement of the exchange 
rate over this period, there is no significant change at the time of  the Plaza 
Agreement. 
Jeffrey Frankel said that he disagreed with Poole and Feldstein that one can- 
not see the effects of  sterilized intervention by  looking at exchange rate pat- 
terns in  1985. Frankel argued that, although people generally date the inter- 
vention from the time of  the Plaza meeting, it actually began in January or 
February 1985 after the G-5 meeting in London. At both meetings, the partici- 
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fraction of  that intervention was undertaken by  the United States after the 
Plaza meeting. 
Frankel added that he and economist Kathryn Dominguez had studied the 
sterilized intervention by the German Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve for 
1985-88,  and they had found a statistically significant effect on the value of 
the dollar. The estimated effect was very small, however, except when the inter- 
vention was publicly announced. Thus, one might say that sterilized interven- 
tion is effective because it is signaling future monetary policy, but Frankel did 
not know if this was the correct conclusion to draw. 
Frankel concluded that he had been quite skeptical in the early 1980s that 
sterilized intervention could be effective, but, when the dollar had become so 
strong by late 1984, he had begun to think that it was a good time to try it. He 
thought now that a good case can be made that the intervention pricked the 
speculative exchange rate bubble, starting at the beginning of 1985. 
Geoffrey Carliner wondered why it was necessary to use sterilized interven- 
tion as a signal that the U.S. government wanted the dollar to depreciate when 
Volcker and Baker could simply have stated their desire for this to happen. 
Volcker said that Baker wanted to use this issue as a negotiating tool, by 
threatening other countries that, unless they took action to strengthen their cur- 
rencies, the United States would take action to depreciate the dollar. 
Feldstein pointed out that, had Baker wanted only to threaten other coun- 
tries, he could have contacted his counterparts in Bonn and Tokyo and deliv- 
ered the message privately. Feldstein thought that, by  making a public an- 
nouncement, Baker had placed himself  in  a no-lose position in the United 
States. If the dollar did not fall, that would have been because foreigners had 
taken the policy steps that the United States desired. If  the dollar did fall, that 
would have shown how powerful Baker was. Essentially, Baker had been able 
to convince the U.S. public that a falling dollar would be a virtue and a sign of 
U.S. strength. 
Bergsten said that the policy became much riskier for Baker as U.S. interest 
rates started to increase in early 1987. To continue the depreciation of the dol- 
lar, Baker needed to persuade Volcker to combat the rising interest rates with 
expansionary monetary policy. Yet Volcker did not seem to accede to Baker’s 
requests, and Bergsten asked Volcker if this had been a problem. 
Volcker responded that there really had not been much of a conflict. The 
Federal Reserve had not tightened monetary policy to a point that was dis- 
turbing to Baker, and it was not clear that even tighter policy would have 
prompted Baker to publicize their differences. 
Bergsten believed that Baker had been more committed to expansionary 
monetary policy and further depreciation of the dollar than Volcker admitted. 
The trade deficit was still increasing, and many in Congress continued to call 
for protectionist measures. Further, the Treasury wanted the dollar to continue 
falling so as to apply additional pressure on the Germans and Japanese to ex- 
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Michael Mussa returned to Poole’s point about the dangers of exchange mar- 
ket intervention. He thought that the danger was that a country would try to 
defend a particular exchange rate that was really indefensible. This would cost 
the taxpayers large amounts of money, and, in an effort to save both money and 
prestige, the government might change fundamental economic policy in a way 
that could be detrimental to more important policy objectives. 
Feldstein asked whether there was any evidence that this had happened in 
the 1980s. In particular, he wondered whether the Federal Reserve had kept 
interest rates higher in  1987 than they would otherwise have been, in order to 
defend the value of the dollar under the Louvre Agreement. 
Mussa replied that the record of the Federal Open Market Committee indi- 
cated that the Federal Reserve had in fact been concerned with the exchange 
rate at that time. It was not clear, however, whether they were concerned be- 
cause of the exchange rate itself or because of the inflationary implications of 
further depreciation. Mussa thought that there was really no way  to separate 
these issues. 
Mussa added that Federal Reserve Governor Manuel Johnson had dissented 
from a later Fed decision regarding intervention, arguing that the Fed should 
not support the Treasury’s decision to intervene. Johnson expressed concern 
that the Treasury was trying to resist a clearly rising trend of the dollar, rather 
than intervening as a signal or to smooth market developments. This was an- 
other instance in which one might argue that exchange market intervention 
was inappropriate. 
Thomas Enders said that he thought that the Federal Reserve had not been 
entirely responsible for the rise in interest rates in 1987. In fact, the yield curve 
tilted upward, in  addition to shifting upward, which is hard to attribute to 
tighter monetary policy. The real cause of the rise in interest rates was probably 
an increasing lack of long-term foreign capital. 
Mussa agreed and pointed out that, while the Germans and Japanese had 
been lowering interest rates in the spring of  1987, by the summer they were 
raising them. The Federal Reserve must have felt that, if it did not allow U.S. 
interest rates to rise along with foreign interest rates, it would have faced a 
significant depreciation of the dollar. 
William Niskanen offered two comments about sterilized intervention.  First, 
he argued that there is no evidence that the Federal Reserve had subordinated 
its concern about stabilizing domestic demand to any concern about the ex- 
change rate during the entire period 1984-88.  In particular, although the Fed 
may have accommodated policy to exchange rate concerns for very brief peri- 
ods of time, it did not do so over any period as long as three months. Second, 
Niskanen did not know of  any argument that suggested that the Fed’s single 
policy tool should be directed toward stabilizing exchange rates rather than 
stabilizing nominal domestic demand. The Federal Reserve cannot stabilize 
both, so it must pick one, and Niskanen did not see any reason why the Fed 
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toward domestic economic goals had been the right thing for the Federal Re- 
serve to do. 
Niskanen added that he thought that the primary objective of the Plaza and 
Louvre agreements had been to place constraints on the Fed’s behavior. Then 
Baker had timed his speeches about the dollar so that it had looked as though 
he had a lot of influence over the Federal Reserve. In fact, Federal Reserve 
policy had not been affected by either the international agreements or Baker’s 
speeches. 
Bergsten responded that Niskanen’s argument goes back to the basic ques- 
tion of  whether the Plaza Agreement had any effect on the dollar exchange 
rate. It was clear that there were differences among the conference participants 
on this subject. Frankel argued that intervention can make a difference, and 
Bergsten supported this view. He believed that sterilized intervention can affect 
the exchange rate by influencing market psychology and expectations and by 
signaling future policy. He said that, if one could use rational economic analy- 
sis to explain the rapid appreciation of the dollar in late 1984 and early 1985, 
then one could say that the decline was purely rational as well. But, in fact, 
there was no rational economic theory that explained the final 20 percent of 
the dollar’s rise, so one cannot dismiss the idea that the Plaza Agreement was 
effective through psychological channels. 
Mussa maintained that the basic path of the foreign exchange value of the 
dollar is determined by  fundamental monetary and fiscal policy and that ex- 
change rate policy, meaning sterilized intervention, has little influence on it. 
But he thought that it was plausible that exchange rate policy could have some 
small effect, as Frankel and Bergsten were arguing. 
Feldstein claimed that 1987 had been very different from earlier periods 
because the exchange market intervention had been accompanied by changes 
in  U.S. monetary policy and by massive purchases of  dollar securities by  the 
Japanese. Both the monetary policy changes and the asset purchases showed 
the markets that the countries were prepared to sacrifice their domestic mone- 
tary policy goals in order to reach their exchange rate goals. This willingness 
to change fundamental policies on the basis of  exchange rate considerations 
had  greatly  increased  the  power  of  the  sterilized  intervention signal.  So 
Feldstein concluded that intervention had  mattered during this  period,  al- 
though not for the standard reasons. 
Returning to  an earlier comment, Feldstein asked Mussa to explain the 
mechanism by  which a budget deficit can produce a current account deficit 
without affecting either interest rates or the dollar. 
Mussa responded that interest rates probably did rise in response to the ex- 
pansionary fiscal policy but that the budget deficit was not the primary force 
affecting those rates. He said that it is very difficult to find correlations be- 
tween the budget deficit, interest rates, and the dollar. Mussa added that the 
existence of  a budget deficit may mean that domestic spending exceeds in- 
come, which directly produces a current account deficit. If the economy has 366  Summary of Discussion 
nontraded goods, then the real exchange rate reacts to the current account 
deficit, without requiring any link to interest rates. 
Bergsten returned to the issue of whether sterilized intervention was costly 
for taxpayers. He argued that, in fact, the United States had made money over 
time through various interventions. When the Carter administration had inter- 
vened, for example, it had made over $1 billion. 
David Richardson remarked that short-term expediency can sometimes lead 
to bad long-term policies. He emphasized the point in Frankel’s paper that the 
temporarily large trade deficits in the early 1980s had resulted in a 1988 trade 
bill that may do long-term damage to U.S. trade policy. 